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U.C.L.A. Law Review			 		
Statutory Interpretation as “Interbranch Dialogue”?
James J. Brudney & Ethan J. Leib

ABSTRACT
Much in the field of statutory interpretation is predicated on “interpretive dialogue” between
courts and legislatures. Yet, the idea of such dialogue is often advanced as little more than a
slogan; the dialogue that courts, legislators, and scholars are imagining too often goes unexamined
and underspecified. This Article attempts to organize thinking about the ways participants and
theorists conceive, and should conceive, of interbranch dialogue within statutory interpretation.
The Article itself proceeds by using a dialogic and dialectical method. It first develops various
positions against “interbranch dialogue.” By invoking arguments from textualism, public choice,
and positive political theory, it advances the position that dialogue should not animate thinking in
statutory interpretation.
With that auspicious start, the Article then explores in conceptual and descriptive terms what
would count as true dialogic activity. Interbranch dialogue is not reducible to mere textual
pronouncements or anticipatory signaling efforts. Rather, it is best understood as responsive
communication between the two institutions, in which each party listens to, takes seriously,
and values what the other party says and thinks, even if there is disagreement on particular
interpretive outcomes or their implications. This communication may emerge in unscripted
or unanticipated terms or it may flow more formally from mechanisms designed to generate
responsive exchange. The Article highlights and examines numerous modes of dialogue that are
initiated by the legislature and also by the courts, using examples from both federal and state levels.
The Article concludes by rehabilitating and rejuvenating the dialogue model in normative terms,
drawing interbranch dialogue back to its legal process roots and revealing its links to more
contemporary deliberative democratic theory.
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INTRODUCTION
It is not terribly controversial to say that “much interpretive theory and
doctrine” in the field of statutory interpretation is predicated on “interpretive
dialogue between courts and [the legislative branch].”1 Indeed, judges,
legislators, and scholars often imagine some kind of “interbranch dialogue”
between courts and legislators. Yet it is not clear how seriously to take this
unexamined and underspecified form of conversation among institutions.2 This
Article is an effort to explore the appropriate way to think about that dialogue,
which does so much to shape the contours of theory and doctrine in statutory
interpretation.
Outside the world of statutory interpretation, there is a fairly developed
debate about interbranch dialogue among constitutional theorists,3 especially in
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.4 In those regimes,
where legislative supremacy competes with judicial supremacy in matters of
fundamental rights, interbranch dialogue between legislatures and courts has
been a fruitful way to conceptualize how courts can protect rights without
derogating from foundational democratic commitments.5 Within this framework,

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 917 (2013).
But see Jeffrey K. Tulis, Deliberation Between Institutions, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 200 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003) (furnishing a short account of
institutions engaging in “deliberation” together).
See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS
(1988); Christine Bateup, Reassessing the Dialogic Possibilities of Weak-Form Bills of Rights,
32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 529 (2009); Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of
Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values With Second-Look Rules of Interbranch
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575 (2001); Kent Roach, Sharpening the Dialogue
Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 169 (2007).
Some basis for grouping these jurisdictions together comes from Stephen Gardbaum.
STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (2013).
For more analysis and critique of these efforts, see Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise:
Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV.
1109 (2006); Aileen Kavanagh, The Lure and the Limits of Dialogue, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 83
(2016); Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, 23 SUP.
CT. L. REV. 7, 33–34 (2004). At least in Canada, the foundational article is Peter W. Hogg &
Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997).
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some have taken up the project of getting more specific in delineating what
interbranch dialogue can and should look like.6
In the U.S. setting, however, debate about interbranch dialogue is often
preoccupied with the hoary “countermajoritarian difficulty” that structures so
much thinking about constitutional law.7 The work “dialogue” is supposed to do
within American constitutional law is mainly to reinforce legislative power to
contest a judicial monopoly in rights-specification8 by celebrating weaker forms
of judicial review.9
By contrast, given that legislatures have formal baseline supremacy in the
statutory arena,10 “interbranch dialogue” might very well be a kind of standard

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Justice Frank Iacobucci, who served on the Supreme Court of Canada from 1991 to 2004,
brought the idea of interbranch dialogue to the center of his constitutional jurisprudence.
See Kent Roach, A Dialogue About Principle and a Principled Dialogue: Justice Iacobucci’s
Substantive Approach to Dialogue, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 449 (2007). And Kent Roach has
done some work expanding outward from constitutional law in Canada, showing the
relevance of dialogic thinking within Canadian statutory interpretation. See Kent Roach,
Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian
Legislatures, 80 CAN. BAR REV. 481, 507–17 (2001).
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1985); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
Indeed, already in Bickel’s work, interbranch dialogue is introduced as a way to mitigate
judicial supremacy in matters of constitutional rights. See BICKEL, supra, at 70–71;
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91–92 (1970);
Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1957).
See Kavanagh, supra note 5, at 107 (“[T]he metaphor of dialogue was a useful reminder that
protecting rights is not a ‘judge-only’ affair.”). Bickel often saw the Court as “beginning [the]
conversations between the Court and the people and their representatives [that] are never,
at the start, conversations between equals.” See BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
OF PROGRESS, supra note 7, at 91. By contrast, dialogue about statutory interpretation might
be initiated or dominated by legislators, routinely extend over many iterations, and feature
the legislature as the ultimate authority. See infra Parts II–III. The default to the centrality
of courts is also in evidence in Guido Calabresi’s otherwise sophisticated typology of forms
of review between the oversimplified poles of judicial and legislative supremacy. See Guido
Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the BorkBrennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1991).
See generally Rosalind Dixon, Weak-Form Judicial Review and American Exceptionalism, 32
OX. J. LEGAL STUDS. 487 (2012). The distinction between “strong-form” and “weak-form”
judicial review is often credited to Mark Tushnet. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, New Forms of
Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights—and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 813, 837 (2003). Aileen Kavanagh had raised some questions about
distortions attributable to overdrawing the distinction between strong and weak forms of
review. See Aileen Kavanagh, What’s So Weak About “Weak-Form Review”? The Case of
the UK Human Rights Act of 1998, 13 INT’L J. CON. L. 1008 (2015).
See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In
the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master.”). See generally William N.
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model.11 Perhaps this should not be surprising: unlike in American
constitutional law, federal and state judges interpreting statutes do not regularly
get the final word on what the law means. Thus, turning to dialogue, imagining
a back and forth in which neither branch enjoys a preemptive interpretive
position, is a way to envisage joint policymaking in the statutory domain, which
specifies and realizes so many rights and obligations.
Still, one could be forgiven for thinking that talk of dialogue is more
mystifying than clarifying. Some questions that quickly come to mind: How can
institutions really converse? Isn’t this anthropomorphism of dialogue
essentially misleading because, like man and ibex,12 courts and legislatures speak
different languages? Is there a real risk that taking the metaphor too seriously
obscures institutional role responsibilities that require more focused attention
on litigants and the public interest? Although some agree that “the temporal
distance between different officials” in interbranch dialogue “does not . . . negate
participation in the same” joint project of making and applying the law,13 it is
worth asking whether the metaphor is just too thin as it seeks to capture
legislative-judicial interactions over decades in which legislative membership
changes every few years and court membership changes over time as well.
Perhaps we might do better abandoning the trope of “dialogue” in favor of
a more traditional conception of the “separation of powers” in which each
institution does its part, and the systemic consequences of those iterative actions
and reactions serve to legitimate the polity in a less self-conscious and
personalized way than the idea of “dialogue” invites.14 Finally, perhaps the
overwhelming emphasis within statutory interpretation on federal law has made
it harder to see how interbranch dialogue might actually work better at the state

11.

12.
13.
14.

Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); Daniel A. Farber,
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 8 (2014) (discussing importance of “how
Congress signals its meaning, and what Congress expects of those interpreting its laws”);
VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 33 (2016) (emphasizing that
judges must understand and respond to Congress’s legislative rules and electoral incentives
as part of the interpretive enterprise); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1992) (arguing in favor of judicial “dialogue with other organs of
government”).
See newcanodin, Don’t Argue With an Ibex English Subs, YOUTUBE (Feb. 12, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v07Q9i2UpNk.
DIMITRIOS KYRITSIS, SHARED AUTHORITY: COURTS AND LEGISLATURES IN LEGAL THEORY 83
(2015).
This vision might be gleaned from Tulis, supra note 2, at 207–10, though Tulis is ultimately
convinced that “when separation of powers does work as designed, it has as its core the
notion of inter-branch deliberation.” Id. at 210.
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level, owing to more similarity between elected judges and elected legislators,
bringing their interactions closer informally, culturally, and professionally.15
In the face of such questions and criticisms, we attempt here to organize
thinking about the ways judges, legislators, and scholars imagine, and should
imagine, interbranch dialogue within statutory interpretation. The Article is
ultimately an effort to vindicate the dialogue metaphor in both descriptive and
normative terms. As we will show, interbranch dialogue is not reducible to mere
pronouncements or anticipatory and strategic signaling efforts. Rather, it is best
understood as responsive communication between the two institutions, acting
through their representatives, in which each institution listens, learns, takes
seriously, and enhances its understanding of statutory issues over time, even if
there is disagreement on particular interpretive outcomes or their implications.
This responsive interplay, in turn, should be viewed as part of the legal process
tradition of institutional humility and deliberation in the production of law.16
The theme of interbranch dialogue thus weaves together old-school legal process
with new-school deliberative democratic theory.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I seeks to derail this project at its
inception. We develop, in a dialectical manner,17 various arguments against a
“dialogue” metaphor and model, advancing the position that, given our legal and
political culture, no conception of dialogue should animate thinking in statutory
interpretation. With that auspicious start, in Part II we define what we would
count as true dialogic activity. We then review several dimensions of statutory
interpretation that actually rely on some conception of meaningful interbranch
dialogue. In descriptive terms, we highlight modes of dialogue that are initiated
by the legislature and also by the courts, using examples from both federal and

15.

16.

17.

For some analysis of how to think about the project of statutory interpretation by elected
judges, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory
Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2012). In this vein, it might be useful in a future
paper to contemplate whether federal interbranch dialogue worked better or worse, or
looked more or less like “real” conversation, in the days when Congress and the Supreme
Court were in the same building and the days when Supreme Court judges were more often
chosen from a pool of candidates with experience in, and deep institutional knowledge of,
Congress.
On linking “dialogue theory” to legal process, see Roach, supra note 3, at 189. See also LON
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 91, 134, 192 (1969) (understanding law as a “complex
collaborative effort” rather than “one-way projection of authority,” with “reciprocal
dependence” between legislative drafters and judicial adjudicators); Roach, A Dialogue
about Principle and a Principled Dialogue, supra note 6, at 454, 458 (developing a connection
between legislative-judicial dialogue). We elaborate on the connection between interbranch
dialogue and the legal process tradition in Part III.
Hat tip to Henry Hart. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
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state systems. Part II also attends to how each institution’s ongoing identity, and
the operation of internal professional networks, contribute to the quality and
continuity of the dialogue. Part III rehabilitates and rejuvenates interbranch
dialogue in normative terms. We draw our conception of dialogue back to its
roots in a legal process account of how best to have our political and legal
institutions work together to promote our interests in a democracy and push it
outside that etiology into more mainstream contemporary deliberative
democratic thinking. In defending a version of interbranch dialogue, we identify
some risks nondialogic accounts of statutory interpretation pose for the role
responsibilities of legislators and judges.
To be sure, a fuller project of vindicating interbranch dialogue in statutory
interpretation would ultimately need to consider other institutional actors, notably
the executive, as part of more complex “trialogues.”18 We focus in what follows,
however, on legislatures and courts, because they are the primary interlocutors
in the vision of dialogue that drives the enterprise of statutory interpretation, and
also because many of our insights should be portable to dialogic activity among other
branches of government.19
I.

THE METAPHOR AS MYTH

There are several reasons to be skeptical that “interbranch dialogue” is
anything more than a slogan. And there are a few reasons one might offer to
caution against indulging in mythical metaphorical thinking. In this Part, we
develop a cluster of arguments that together counsel against a dialogic account

18.

19.

The “executive” here could be the President (who can speak through various public
statements including executive orders, veto statements, and, more recently, tweets),
administrative agencies generally, or the Department of Justice specifically. For some
careful thinking about these complexities in the United States, see Rebecca Ingber,
Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359
(2013). On European “trialogues,” see Fabrizio Cafaggi, On the Transformations of
European Consumer Enforcement Law: Judicial and Administrative Trialogues, Instruments
and Effects, in JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 223 (Fabrizio Cafaggi &
Stephanie Law eds., 2017).
Foreshadowing our discussion in Part II, an analysis of agency-legislature interactions
might include exploration of the uptake of testimony at congressional hearings by agency
officials responsible for interpreting statutory text in order to appreciate when this is an
element of responsive communication as opposed to mere signaling. Relevant agency-court
interactions might include an interrogation of how to characterize operation of the Chevron
deference framework, especially in settings of dynamic agency updating. See, e.g., Smiley v.
Citibank (S. D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (deferring to federal banking regulation that
is inconsistent with prior agency interpretations, explaining that “change is not [per se]
invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the
ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency”).
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of statutory interpretation.20 Some of these arguments are familiar in the public
choice, positive political theory, and textualist literature, but no one has strung
all of them together in one place to try to undermine the metaphor of dialogue as
utter mythology. In our view, there is value in presenting a strong case against
“interbranch dialogue” to see if it is salvageable in Parts II and III, on both
descriptive and normative levels.
A.

Political and Legal Institutions Issue Commands,
Not Conversational Gambits

Although legislative-judicial back-and-forth over statutory meaning may
be imagined as dialogue, most of what legislatures and courts do is make law.
They are not in the business of talking to each other. To be sure, sometimes it is
possible to make their utterances line up so that their pronouncements resemble
a script or morality play:
J: Statute A means X.
L: No, J, statute A really means Y and Z, and statute B we are passing
today now makes that clear.
J: Although you want statute A to now mean Y and Z, we think X
remains relevant and precedential, so we are going to develop its
logic further into statute B.
L: Really, J? Do we have to keep doing this? We have stuff to do
other than grade your papers.

Although this looks like a conversation, courts and legislatures are not
really talking to each other when doing their work. Indeed, if they are talking to
anyone, they are talking to citizens through their internal deliberations and
talking to posterity. Still, the better reading is that they are just talking in the
idiom that comports with their institutional culture, and the two idioms do not
routinely intersect. Both of those idioms, moreover, sound in command rather
than as invitations into or participation in interbranch deliberation. In sum,

20.

To the extent some have made an effort to cast doubt on the reality of interbranch dialogue
among statutory interpretation scholars, Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 914 n.28,
identify Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 597–616 (2002); and Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 922–25 (2003), as
holding the view that “dialogue simply does not exist.” But neither of these cited papers
contains systematic engagements with the relevant question, nor does either focus any
attention on “interbranch dialogue” as a trope, theory, model, or metaphor.
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neither legislation nor judicial opinions are communications between the
branches.21
B.

Institutions Signal; They Don’t Converse

Perhaps there are some marginal examples when the best reading of what
these two commanding institutions are doing is directing their commands to
each other rather than to subjects or litigants or interest groups. Nonetheless, it
would be too fanciful to imagine these interactions as true conversation because
the institutions do not really treat one another as coequals in a joint enterprise in
these episodes:
L: Interpret remedial statute Q to be in derogation of the common
law.
J: Generally, statutes in derogation of the common law will be
narrowly construed unless you tell us very specifically, L, what to do
with Q. Calling the statute remedial is not sufficient, because the
common law is better reasoned than the hurriedly negotiated and
often cynical deals that give rise to legislation like Q.

At best, the Ls and Js of the nation can be thought to be sending one another
imperfect anticipatory signals, strategically communicating in a way to protect
their own interests and domains against the other. These are the joint lessons of
public choice theory and positive political theory: Institutions will protect
themselves and their capital, and they will be anticipatorily responsive to other
institutions that can divert policy from the acting institution’s favored course.22
And such actions, based on self-protection and anticipatory responsiveness, are
just signals and reminders, not true conversations. If a conversation requires
some kind of joint project, these kinds of issuances have a different goal: They
are at bottom self-involved.

21.

22.

The view that “courts are mistaken in thinking of legislation as a means of communication,”
Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 996 (2017), has
been questioned by Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation
and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE
IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). Doerfler ultimately finds
“‘[l]egislation as communication’” to be the “‘standard picture’ among legal theorists”
because “[it] has intuitive appeal.” Doerfler, supra, at 996 (citing Mark Greenberg, The
Moral Impact Theory of the Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1296–97 (2014)).
See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1999); Einer Elhauge,
Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).
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Institutions Are Signaling to Different Audiences, Seeking
to Achieve Different Goals

Not only can serial pronouncements not amount to a dialogue or
conversation but very often the presumptive speech acts that look like they
are addressed to coordinate branches of government have different audiences
and are not, upon inspection, really facing each other. To wit, imagine this
“conversation:”
L: Murder is a crime.
J: We cannot read into L’s command a self-defense exception
because that messes with the separation of powers. We can only
enforce the text and the text does not authorize us to infer any
excuse that pertains to self-defense. You are the legislature, L! If
you want a self-defense exception, write it in! No one in this
democracy wants judges to be too “activist,” writing in all kinds of
nontextual exceptions.

On the one hand, there is a reading here in which J is giving L clear
instructions (a command?) about how to write an effective command itself.
Some might interpret this interaction as the beginning of a dialogue about
getting murder laws written better and implemented in a more rational and
democratic manner.
But it is not at all obvious that this is the best interpretation of the
interaction. Rather, it may be that J has its own view about how to interpret
statutes and its own views about what is best for democracy. That view is known
as “textualism,” and part of that commitment is to make a show of enforcing texts
literally, chastening the legislature for poor drafting.23 Although J knows full well
that L is not listening (or is indifferent about L’s listening), the relevant audience
is not L at all. Instead, the interested public (including legal scholars and the
media), the convicted defendant, and other jurists are the real audience here.
Throwing the gauntlet down to the legislature is not really for the legislature’s
benefit but is for the benefit of the justificatory apparatus that sustains textualism
as an interpretive philosophy. The interaction is strategic but not in the
conventional positive political theory sense, because it is not an anticipatory
reaction to what the legislature may or may not do. Rather, it is a rhetorical
strategy to sustain J’s own set of preferences by justifying them to people other
than L.

23.

See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997).
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And it is not only judges that may behave this way. Because of the
presumptive finality of many judicial pronouncements, “legislators remain free
to put on dog and pony shows for the amusement and delight of select
constituencies.”24 And legislators are mostly “interested in advancing favored
policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within” the
legislature.25 They are not institutionally oriented toward nor able to engage in
dialogue under modern conditions of internal professionalization and
polarization.26 Even more to the point, legislatures generally can be perfectly
happy to rewrite their statutes when judges push the issue: as Keith Whittington
observes, both courts and legislatures are “capable of getting what they want
because they want different things.”27 Courts want legal supremacy; legislatures
want policy supremacy and can find workarounds for their policy goals when
necessary.28 Since they want different things, they are not in any joint project that
requires dialogue.
D.

Institutions Are Unstable Bodies

There is another problem with indulging in the myth of dialogue: the
relevant institutions are always changing their membership. In the federal
system, Congress changes official status and membership every two years, and
even the “Roberts Court” changes its membership over the course of a few years.
Thus, the idea that “Congress” and the “Roberts Court” are in conversation
belies all the underlying personnel changes that disrupt thinking clearly about
who is talking to whom. Consider this “dialogue”:
J (in 1989): L’s statute from 1964 requires plaintiffs to bear certain
substantial burdens of proof.
L (in 1991): We are passing a new statute to make clear that J was
wrong in 1989 about what we meant in 1964.
J (in 2000): Whatever else “you” meant in 1991, L, you aren’t the
same people who passed the 1964 statute and you don’t get to say
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.

Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1998).
Neal Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1495, 1496 (2017).
Id. at 1498–500 (citing, inter alia, J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN
CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 23–30 (2004); Richard
L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86
S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 233–42 (2013)).
Keith E. Whittington, James Madison Has Left the Building, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1146
(2005) (reviewing PICKERILL, supra note 26).
Devins, supra note 25, at 1516.
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what “you” really meant then. So going forward, we can follow your
new command, but stop pretending you have any epistemological
priority about what the people within L meant in 1964.

It is not that it is impossible or wholly incoherent to make sense of a
“continuing body” theory of a legislature or a court.29 But there is something
quite plausible about J-in-2000’s claim that L-in-1991 gets very limited
epistemological priority about what L-in-1964 intended.30 To be sure, nothing
about this plausible claim disables L-in-1991 from establishing statutory law
going forward. But looking back at eleven years of talking by J and L looks a lot
less like a conversation when you realize that personnel changes disrupt the idea
of dialogue, at least in a rich and personal sense.
E.

Institutions Have No Collective Intent So Cannot Meaningfully Chat

The personal sense of conversation could, perhaps, be vindicated if there
was a way to aggregate the various members of the institutions into a collective
and unitary voice. But as many have shown, figuring out how to aggregate 535
minds on the federal level is tricky;31 the many minds problem also plagues state
legislatures. This leads to a conclusion by some scholars who have looked
carefully at the issue that “attributions to [legislatures] of legislative intent are
reliably false.”32 And as Judge Easterbrook has written in United States v. Mitra,
channeling Kenneth Shepsle,33 “Congress is a ‘they’ and not an ‘it’; a committee
lacks a brain (or, rather, has so many brains with so many different objectives
that it is almost facetious to impute a joint goal or purpose to the collectivity).”34
Although some have come up with ways to vindicate the idea of legislative intent
notwithstanding the many minds problem (minds whose preferences together
may “cycle” to produce intransitive and therefore incoherent policy choices),35 it

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

But see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95
IOWA L. REV. 1401 (2010) (criticizing the idea that the Senate should be considered a
continuing body with entrenched supermajoritarian rules).
On the epistemological priority of legislators about their own meaning, see Andrei Marmor,
The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 434 (2008). For some serious doubts,
see Doerfler, supra note 21, at 1033–37.
See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
239 (1992).
Doerfler, supra note 21, at 998.
See Shepsle, supra note 31.
405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005).
The classic citation for the cycling problem in social choice is KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). Those who have tried to defend the
coherence of legislative intent against the Arrovian impossibility theorem’s application to
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is widely contended that talk of the collective intent of a legislature is a
“misleading anthropomorphizing metaphor.”36 And without intent, it is very
hard to imagine a productive dialogue.
L: J, why do you make us work so hard to clarify our meaning? That
case you decided last year is disrespectful of our right to determine
statutory meaning because our conference report was clear that we
rejected your interpretation ten years ago! We are now overriding
that interpretation (again) in this committee report.
J: L, we don’t deny you have rights, but your right is to write statutes.
We can’t assume what a subgroup of your membership writes in a
report was read, let alone approved, by the whole membership.
Some legislator on the floor said something inconsistent with that
report and we can’t try to figure out what you as a body really
meant.37 Any of your nonstatutory utterances could be strategic.
Heck, even your statutory pronouncements could be strategic. But
at least then we have good reason to use as much legal text to make
coherent sense of it, confabulating a fictive but pragmatic collective
intent. Only statutes are the law.
L: Ugh. Can’t we let sleeping dogs lie and avoid the great legislative
history debate? We thought we had an internal norm in which our
reports or the legislation’s sponsors’ views are the best evidence of
our intent.38 These are “institutionalized intentions,” not a
mistaken “collective understanding” which is to be properly
dismissed because of the aggregation problems we all know
about.39
J: It would be more fair if you wrote that norm down somewhere,
since you don’t all always act or talk like that is the rule, and that
isn’t giving fair notice to those regulated by your laws.40

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

legislatures include STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 99
(2010); RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012); and Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 429 (1988).
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO
L. REV. 775, 777 n.7 (1999).
For a case in which the House Report’s interpretation of a statute conflicted with a meaning
given during a colloquy on the Senate floor, see Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 183–86 (1969).
For support for this claim, see Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The
Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 448–49 (2005).
That distinction is further explained in RONALD DWORKIN, How to Read the Civil Rights Act,
in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316, 320–21 (1985).
See Doerfler, supra note 21, at 1010–20 (explaining why using formal and informal norms
to derive collective intent presents real difficulties).
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Sure, this is a kind of dialogue. J and L independently can be modeled as
having shared agency and “we-intentions,”41 an invention by philosophers that
can make sense rather than nonsense of “interbranch dialogue.” But the
“dialogue” between J and L here is actually a useful caution against using too
capacious an idea of dialogue. Only the text of the law communicates and speaks
from the legislature in this conversation. And judges are not wrong to be
suspicious of assertions of collective voices outside of the text of the law. Even if
“interbranch dialogue” is sometimes a “useful fiction,”42 we should be restrained
in our indulgence of the falsehood and acknowledge that it is a “defective
discourse.”43 We should certainly not transition from imperfect metaphor to
“model” or “theory.”44
F.

Institutions Risk Violating Their Role Responsibilities
When Looking to Chat Rather Than Decide

Finally, it may be that “interbranch dialogue” is not only descriptively
misleading but also normatively troubling. To wit, attempting too much to
communicate with a coordinate branch could be said to detract from everyone
doing his or her job well. Legislatures ought to focus on their work of drafting
and enacting laws, which are generally commands rather than conversational
gambits. Courts should focus on interpreting those commands as best they can
and issuing their own clear commands to litigants and citizens, without
imagining some kind of grand systemic deliberation among different kinds of
governmental actors who have very different goals and very different role
responsibilities. Indeed, judicial logic, focused on precedent, is quite different
from the logic of policy improvement that should dominate in the legislature.
Moreover, legislatures may be said to have the “prerogative[] of obscurantism,”45
whereas courts always seem bound by a requirement that they explain,

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

The large literature on joint intentions in groups can be represented by MICHAEL E.
BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF ACTING TOGETHER (2014); Christopher
Kutz, Acting Together, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1, 3 (2000); John R. Searle,
Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 401 (Philip R. Cohen,
Jerry Morgan & Martha E. Pollack eds., 1990); and Scott J. Shapiro, Massively Shared Agency,
in RATIONAL AND SOCIAL AGENCY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL BRATMAN 257, 270
(Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe eds., 2014).
This is Doerfler’s reading of legislative intent, see Doerfler, supra note 21, at 1021, though he
also thinks “abandoning discourse about legislative intent is not a serious option.” Id. at
1022.
Id. at 1021 n.217.
See Kavanagh, supra note 5, at 97, 101–02.
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
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rationalize, and justify their work-product.46 These distinctions suggest that
legislatures and courts may fundamentally be speaking different languages, and
are responsive to different cultures of justification.
Imagining “dialogue” is also so vague and indeterminate that it may very
well confuse courts about what they are supposed to do when: engage in their
best readings with an assumption that legislators can engage them directly when
they go astray or do their best tea-leaf reading with some constructed intent and
delay the application of many of their judgments to invite further conversations
with their legislative overseers?47 Read a statute as creatively as possible to avoid
invalidating the democratic will of the legislature or declare a statute’s
incompatibility with fundamental norms and ask the legislature to revisit the
statute and the norm?48 There is actually a need for interpretive finality so that
people can order their affairs, and too much orientation toward “dialogue” can
delay that for too long in a world of discretionary review and vetogates.49
Worse still, the trope of “interbranch dialogue” can serve to detract from or
obscure the full institutional accountability of both legislatures and courts by
imagining that other institutions are in some kind of joint project. Such a
conception risks buck-passing, enabling occlusion of just who is responsible for
what in a regime of otherwise separated powers. As Lord Bingham comments:
“The business of the judges is to listen to cases and give judgment . . . I do not
myself see it as the role of the judge to engage in dialogue.”50 And it is also just
fine for legislatures to agree with judicial gloss on statutes silently; it may be more
efficient for legislatures not to “dialogue” and not to waste time on interbranch
chatter.51 Ultimately, there is plenty of evidence that legislators are not carefully
listening to judges more than episodically at best.52 This renders the efforts at

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF.
L. REV. 699, 737, 742–43 (2013).
This kind of worry about indeterminacy is at the center of Kavanagh, supra note 5, at 97–99.
See id.
See id. at 117.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
(QUESTIONS 77–79), 2001–02 (UK).
See Kavanagh, supra note 5, at 112–14 (highlighting how “dialogue theory” perversely looks
down on silent agreement among the branches).
See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A
Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662–65 (1992). Notice that if
Congress isn’t actually carefully following what is going on in the courts, that casts some
doubt on the earlier argument, see supra Subpart I.B, that institutions are anticipatorily
reacting to the preferences of other institutions. See also Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L.
Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislatures and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1055 (1991) (“[P]rompt legislative reaction to judicial interpretation is
probably the exception . . . not the rule.”); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing
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“dialogue” both an incursion into a pure or formal separation of powers that
would more fully preserve judicial independence,53 and a waste of precious
governmental resources.
The foregoing seems to us the best way to cast serious doubt on taking
interbranch dialogue too seriously. Is anything left?
II.

THE METAPHOR IN ACTION

This Part develops a working definition of interbranch dialogue and then
tests it against various ways that judges, legislators, and scholars talk about
dialogue within the practices and doctrines of statutory interpretation. We
distinguish between informal or unstructured dialogue, in which the two
branches exchange responsive interpretive views in unscripted and often
unanticipated ways, and more formal dialogue, in which a court or legislature
invokes a mechanism consciously designed to generate responsive
communication. We then consider a range of additional mechanisms that may
generate dialogue between the branches. These mechanisms are more episodic,
but they help fill out our descriptive project of showing how and when it might
be sensible to talk about interbranch dialogue. Finally, we consider the
importance of relative equality between judiciaries and legislatures (as some
have argued that equality is a precondition for dialogue),54 as well as the validity
of thinking about the continuing identity of institutions over time.
In addition to addressing some of the thornier problems raised in Part I, this
Part demonstrates how dialogue can and does occur in the modes we identify,
rendering both plausible and relevant the model of interbranch dialogue for the
practices and doctrines of statutory interpretation. Some modalities of dialogue

53.

54.

Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605–06 (1995)
(“[L]egislatures are frequently too busy, over-extended, or inert to respond to an
objectionable judicial interpretation” and “there is little reason to believe that legislators
systematically monitor judicial interpretations.”). But this indifference is not a universal
phenomenon. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 149–58
(1982) (providing examples of judicial-legislative “open dialogue”); Judith S. Kaye, State
Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and
Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1995) (same).
On the formalism/functionalism divide in separation of powers thinking, see Martin H.
Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were To Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism
in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 496 (1987). But for some evidence that the American framers
contemplated some dialogue between the branches, see Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and
Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 279 (1991).
See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 5, at 47; Hogg & Bushnell, supra note 5, at 79–80.
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will be more congenial depending on whether one’s interpretative preferences
are textualist, intentionalist, or purposivist. But all interpretive approaches can
admit some forms of dialogue. With this conceptual and descriptive foundation,
we can address more directly the normative case for dialogue in Part III.
A.

Defining Dialogue

Having cast substantial doubt on the possibility of interbranch dialogue in
Part I, we might begin here by asking about what one might call the “Platonic
form” of dialogue. Plato appears to have originated the term “dialogue” as a
noun,55 though he may have used the term directly in only a few of the works we
know now as Plato’s dialogues.56 These dialogues are associated with a particular
kind of conversation, shaped into a question-and-answer format, involving a
dialectical exchange with the acquisition of knowledge—“the presentation of
truths or at least the purification of error”—as its aim or endpoint.57 Although
the structured question-and-answer framework of the Platonic form does not
map directly onto the complexity of our interbranch dialogue setting,58 modern
usage adapts some features of Plato’s original idea.
Yet there are features about Platonic dialogues that actually sit in tension
with the sort of dialogic activity that we suspect judges, legislators, and scholars
are envisioning when they map judicial-legislative interactions as dialogue. To
wit, there is an important sense in which the Platonic dialogue is sham dialogue.59
One might say Socrates is not really seeking to learn anything; he is often
manipulating the conversation for pedagogical or political ends rather than
using the format of dialogue to enhance his own knowledge of his subjects.60
Truly dialogic efforts cannot be systemically strategic or manipulative.
Rather, one of the great theorists of “communicative action” (and ultimately of
“deliberative democracy”)—Jürgen Habermas—sees that at the center of
meaningful dialogue must be taking your interlocutor seriously and aiming for

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See Katarzyna Jazdzewska, From Dialogos to Dialogue: The Use of the Term From Plato to
the Second Century CE, 54 GREEK, ROMAN, AND BYZANTINE STUD. 17, 19 (2014).
See id. at 23–24, 28, 34 (citing GORGIAS, 448D–449B, 471D; PROTAGORAS, 335B–336B).
See GEOFFREY ROCKWELL, DEFINING DIALOGUE: FROM SOCRATES TO THE INTERNET 160
(2003).
But cf. supra Introduction (discussing more formal dimensions of interbranch dialogue).
Thanks to Seyla Benhabib for this way of putting it.
See David L. Blank, The Arousal of Emotion in Plato’s Dialogues, 43 CLASSICAL Q. 428, 428–
30 (1993); E.L. Harrison, Plato’s Manipulation of Thrasymachus, 21 PHOENIX 27, 30–35
(1967).
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mutual understanding.61 This may be why deliberative democratic theorists are
at times oriented toward design mechanisms that promote institutional learning
through dialogue.62
Although they are not without their critics,63 one might also consult
dictionaries as evidence of modern usage, to help unpack potential substantive
meanings for this form of communication between the two branches. Webster’s
Third International defines dialogue as “an instance of conversational exchange”
and “an exchange of ideas and opinions, esp. a serious colloquy conducted or
presented to entertain or instruct.”64 The Oxford English Dictionary similarly
references “a conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy”
and “verbal interchange of thought between two or more persons.” That
dictionary further defines dialogue in connection with “politics” as “discussion
or diplomatic contact between the representatives of two nations, groups, or the
like; hence gen. valuable or constructive discussion or communication.”65 These
definitions have shadows of both the Platonic form and the Habermasian ideal.
From these various contexts and definitions—ancient, political theoretic,
and modern—one can begin to cobble together a workable conception of
dialogue between legislatures and courts. Dialogue entails responsive
communication of a certain kind, in which one party listens to, takes seriously,
and values what the other party expresses and believes. It involves communication
about substantive matters—ideas, thoughts, or opinions—between two or more
parties, which can take place between representatives of groups or institutions.

61.
62.

63.

64.
65.

See 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION—LIFEWORLD AND
SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981). Thanks
to Ed Rubin for some guidance here.
See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC
CONSULTATION (2009); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Deliberative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 612 (André Bächtiger et al. eds., 2018); Charles
Sabel, Rethinking the Street-Level Bureaucrat: Tacit and Deliberate Ways Organizations Can
Learn, in ECONOMY IN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MICHAEL J. PIORE 113, 113–42 (Paul
Osterman ed., 2012).
See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.) (“Dictionary
definitions are acontextual, whereas the meaning of sentences depends critically on context,
including all sorts of background understandings.” (citation omitted)); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (referring to dictionaries as “museum[s] of words . . . rather than a means
to decode the work of legislatures”); James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage:
The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483 (2013) (evaluating and criticizing the Court’s pervasive dictionary culture
in statutory interpretation decisions since 1987).
Dialogue, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(unabridged) 623 (1986).
Dialogue, 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 601 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
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The last point—that groups or institutions can speak and participate in
conversation—is supported by contributions from philosophy, psychology, and
political science, as well as law. Lawrence Solan has explored how we routinely
regard groups, whether formally constituted (national legislatures or city
councils) or informally aggregated (neighborhood residents or married
couples), as decisionmaking units imbued with a collective mental state.66 When
positive political theorists emphasize “the meaning that the legislature intended
to convey,” they are relying on the idea of attributed group intent or purpose.67
This group intent or purpose derives from the structural and functional
realities of the legislature as a representative body. At the national level, senators
or representatives essentially assign to subgroups of their colleagues (standing
committees, conference committees, informal bipartisan coalitions, even
majority and minority leaders) the principal responsibility for drafting a text and
then explaining or elaborating on its meaning. There is a collective intent or
purpose because the members who voted for the text are presumed to agree that
the text they approved means what it says, and—in certain instances of
ambiguity—what their authorized or designated colleagues said it means.68
Appellate judges also express collective intent, albeit on a smaller scale,
when joining an opinion authored by one of their colleagues. In doing so,
members of an appellate panel or a supreme court express their support for an
explanation or elaboration of the meaning of contested statutory text.
Debates will continue, of course, over whether institutions such as
legislatures and courts can possess a collective intent.69 But apart from
associating ourselves with the respectable, perhaps predominant view that they
can, sufficiently to make sense of the idea of interbranch dialogue, we will not
dwell further on the issue. More important for present purposes than extending
the debate over whether institutions are able to communicate a collective mental
state is to focus attention on what really counts as forms of responsive
communication between institutions.

66.
67.
68.

69.

See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
89–97 (2010); Solan, supra note 38, at 437–49. See also MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 41 (2000).
See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons From Positive Theories
of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 961–62 (2007).
See James J. Brudney, Intentionalism’s Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1007–08 (2007);
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 52–54 (1994) [hereinafter Brudney,
Congressional Commentary]; McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains
in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 711–13 (1992).
Compare sources cited in Subpart I.E, with sources cited in this Subpart II.A.
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As we illustrate below, these forms may involve exchanges communicated
in purely textual terms, such as a court’s textualist analysis followed by revised or
adjusted legislative language. They also may be reflected in more purposive
exchanges, as when a legislature uses a committee report or conference report to
explain the meaning of complex text and a court response includes its
understanding of legislatively expressed intent or policy.
B.

Informal Dialogue: Signals versus Exchanges

Starting from our conceptual approach to dialogue as responsive
communication in which each party takes seriously what the other party
communicates (as opposed to, say, exclusively strategic posturing), interbranch
dialogue entails some form of engaged and productive interaction between a
legislature and a court. In this regard, consider possible distinctions between
interbranch “signals” (discussed in Subparts I.B–C above) and more deliberative
interbranch “exchanges.”
Interbranch signals are statements by one branch conveying information
or communicating authoritative preferences to the other branch. Typically,
these signals neither invite nor anticipate interactive response. From the judicial
side, the quotidian illustration is when high courts construe contested statutory
text through published decisions. At the Supreme Court level, justices expect
their interpretations to be followed by lower courts and parties in future cases.
Although the Court does not ordinarily look for any response from Congress, it
may occasionally delay an effective date to give Congress time to address the
impact of its decision.70
From the legislative side, “overrides” may be viewed as a form of signaling.
In an override,71 Congress or a state legislature adds new text, signaling its
authoritative preference for a different interpretation than a court gave to the
original text. On one level, the legislature is “responding” to the court’s decision.

70.

71.

See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982); see also
Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17 GREEN BAG 173, 175 (2014) (discussing
how the Supreme Court in Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211
(2009) appeared to give the political branches one last chance to update the outdated and
likely unconstitutional coverage formula under the Voting Rights Act).
See James Buatti & Richard L. Hasen, Response, Conscious Congressional Overriding of the
Supreme Court, Gridlock, and Partisan Politics, 93 TEX. L. REV. 263 (2015); Matthew R.
Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Beth
Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11 AM.
POL. Q. 441 (1983).
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Yet the legislature does not ask the court for its views or seek any further judicial
feedback other than to implement the legislature’s most recent understanding of
the law as amended.72
Legislative “underwrites,” actions evidencing an express endorsement of a
judicial reading of statutory text,73 may also be viewed as a form of legislative
signaling. In identifying and codifying a judicial decision of which it approves,
the legislature does not typically seek or expect any response from the judiciary.
Underwrites indicate that signals between the two branches can be cordial as well
as contentious. Still, these assertions of legislative authority, like the initial
judicial interpretations that they embrace, can be understood as stand-alone
statements rather than elements of an ongoing conversation.74
Legal scholars, including the two of us, have sometimes been too casual in
referring to overrides and underwrites as dialogue itself.75 At the same time, the
picture of legislative action as signal is incomplete in important respects. To wit,
there can be a continuingly interactive set of iterations once the legislature
responds to a judicial interpretation of its work product, whether in the form of
disapproval or approval. Subsequent interpretive decisions by the judiciary
often reflect a further exchange: a judicial expression of refinement or deviation
rather than mere implementation of the adjusted text.76 And legislative underwrites
72.

73.
74.

75.
76.

The legislature may contend—in a purpose section or in legislative history—that it is
correcting a judicial interpretive error and “restoring” the text’s original meaning. See, e.g.,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (purpose
statement). Alternatively, the legislature may maintain that it is simply establishing a new,
prospective meaning. Whether the legislature’s expressed intent is restorative or prospective,
its override is not typically an invitation for courts to respond further.
See Ethan J. Leib & James J. Brudney, Legislative Underwrites, 103 VA. L. REV. 1487 (2017)
(describing and analyzing the surprisingly frequent occurrence of underwrites at the federal
and state levels).
At the state level, interpretive directions contained in legislative resolutions may be a form of
interbranch signaling, too. For example, 2017 Oklahoma House Resolution No. 1004,
approved by the House in May 2017, provides “THAT Oklahoma judges and specifically
justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court are directed not to interfere with this Legislature’s
right to clarify Oklahoma criminal law regarding abortion per Section 36 of Article V of the
Oklahoma Constitution.” H.R. Res. 1004, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017). The House
resolution responds to two recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions invalidating state
statutory provisions restricting access to abortions. See Burns v. Cline, 387 P. 3d 348 (Okla.
2016) (invalidating 2014 Okla. Sen. Bill No. 1848); Burns v. Cline, 382 P. 3d 1048 (Okla. 2016)
(invalidating 2014 Okla. Sen. Bill No. 642). Although the legislature may hope the state
supreme court will respond in future decisions, supervening federal constitutional dimensions
of the abortion debate would seem to make this Resolution something other than a genuine
request for dialogue.
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 26, at 208; Leib & Brudney, supra note 73, at 1494, 1499, 1521–
22.
See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009) [hereinafter
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of lower court decisions do more than affix a seal of approval. They also inform
other lower courts that conflicting interpretations should be abandoned, thereby
fostering judicial consistency on matters of statutory meaning.77
Less harmoniously, Congress has overridden consecutive Supreme Court
decisions construing the same statutory text, in the process remonstrating with
the Court for not following its earlier legislative instruction. For example, in the
course of amending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), Congress in 1978 overrode the Court’s decision in United Air Lines,
Inc. v. McMann,78 and then in 1990 overrode the decision in Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts.79 In both instances, the Court had held that a
pension plan established before the ADEA effective date but continuing for years
or decades thereafter could not be deemed “a subterfuge to evade the Act or its
purposes.”80 Congress’s second override, addressing the Betts decision, was
accompanied by committee report language that was surely meant to be
responsive and edifying, albeit unusually harsh.81
Indeed, overrides may result in judicial replies that contribute to an
ongoing, if somewhat combative, exchange between the branches.82 In recent

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Widiss, Shadow]; Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2012) [hereinafter Widiss, Hydra].
See Leib & Brudney, supra note 73, at 1527–28.
434 U.S. 192 (1977).
492 U.S. 158 (1989).
See S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 28 (1990), accompanying Older Workers Benefit Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (explaining Congress’s override in 1978 of
McMann and in 1990 of Betts).
See S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 29. It reads:
Once again, the Committee intends to overturn the erroneous interpretation of
the Supreme Court . . . . The Committee regrets that the Supreme Court in
Betts chose not to credit the language of the 1978 Conference Report, language
that appeared in the Congressional Record and was overwhelmingly approved
by both Houses of Congress. The Committee hopes that in the future the
Supreme Court will take more seriously such expressions of legislative intent,
particularly when they are subject to the same review and ratification as the
language of the statute.

82.

Id.
One example of such an institutional exchange that has spanned decades and implicated a
number of legislative initiatives involves whether federal statutes awarding to prevailing
plaintiffs “costs” or “reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs” should be understood as
encompassing expert fees. The Court, in a series of divided decisions, has declined to read
these textual provisions as incorporating coverage of, or full compensation for, expert fees.
See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (construing
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2000 [IDEA]); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (construing Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976);
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1920
assessing costs in civil litigation). The majority in Crawford announced a requirement of
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times, the Supreme Court has replied to override statutes in interactive ways that
reassert its own interpretive heft. These include confining the reach of the
override, thereby reviving aspects of its overridden interpretation as a form of
“shadow precedent,”83 and inferring from the override that it can approach on a
clean slate identical but unamended language in a closely related statute.84
In short, the distinction between unilateral signaling and dialogic exchange
starts to break down when one considers the extended interplay that often
accompanies legislative overrides and underwrites. Both types of laws signal
responses to judicial decisions—rebukes or endorsements. But when the courts
then engage those legislative responses with new decisions of their own, pointing
in various directions—switching course to adhere, ironing out inconsistencies to
conform, or limiting scope to constrain—the institutional signals can evolve into
an interbranch exchange. This exchange reflects the deliberative acquisition by
both institutions of new understandings about statutory meaning, even when
the understandings are not always acquired in congenial circumstances.85
Similar ongoing exchanges take place at the state level. One notable
example involves an extended conversation about the meaning and application
of Oregon’s statute codifying the method of statutory construction for courts to
follow. The law provided that “[i]n the construction of a statute, the court shall
pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.”86 This succinct cardinal rule
caused considerable confusion as to when it was appropriate to consult

83.
84.
85.
86.

“explicit statutory authority” in order to reallocate the burden of expert witness costs.
Crawford, 482 U.S. 437. The dissenters in Murphy and Casey argued vehemently that
Congress in its conference and committee reports (accompanying statutes enacted both
prior and subsequent to Crawford’s “explicit authority” rule) had expressed a clear purpose
to cover expert fees, but the majority in each decision relied on the absence of such an
explicit reference in the enacted text. See Murphy, 548 U.S. at 308, 312–13 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Casey, 499 U.S. at 103, 108–11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Congress overrode
Casey as part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and members have been critical of Murphy in the
years since it was decided. See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. S5510 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2014)
(introducing bill that “clarifies Congress’ express intent” that parents prevailing under the
IDEA should recover expert witness fees); 157 CONG. REC. S1833–34 (daily ed. Mar. 17,
2011) (same). For an in-depth discussion of this extended dialogue, encompassing
additional statutes and court decisions, see PETER L. STRAUSS, LEGAL METHODS:
UNDERSTANDING AND USING CASES AND STATUTES 526–59, 605–58 (3d ed. 2014).
See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 626–28 (2007). See generally
Widiss, Shadow, supra note 76.
See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009). See generally Widiss,
Hydra, supra note 76.
See Luc B. Tremblay, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between
Courts and Legislatures, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 617, 630–32 (2005).
OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020 (2017).
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legislative history in pursuit of such an intention.87 The Oregon Supreme Court,
in its 1993 Portland General Electric (PGE) decision then construed the statute to
establish a three-step methodology for determining legislative intent: legislative
history was only to be consulted at stage two, after textual analysis revealed an
ambiguity in the legislature’s intentions.88 In the years that followed, the Oregon
Supreme Court’s consistent application of its 1993 framework resulted in a
strong textual turn for the court’s statutory construction decisions—a marked
increase in reliance on dictionary definitions of statutory terms as well as a
noticeable drop in the court’s reliance on legislative history.89
In 2001, the Oregon legislature addressed the PGE framework by adding
language to its cardinal rule, providing that the parties may offer legislative
history in any case, whether there is ambiguity or not.90 Although initially
refusing to acknowledge the likelihood that the 2001 statute had altered its
interpretive method,91 the Court in 2009 responded to the amendment in State
v. Gaines,92 acknowledging the effect of the 2001 alteration on the PGE approach.
The Court concluded that the statute now placed legislative history on par with
the text and its linguistic context, and that the legislature intended to ease the
rigid constraint PGE had placed on courts’ permission to review otherwise
pertinent legislative history.93 In recent statutory cases following Gaines, the
Oregon Supreme Court has regularly consulted legislative history.94 And the

87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

94.

Compare Morasch v. State, 493 P.2d 1364, 1365 (Or. 1972) (gathering legislative intent from
text and consulting legislative history when the text is ambiguous), with State v. Leathers,
531 P.2d 901, 904 (Or. 1975) (giving due consideration to legislative history in ascertaining
intent regardless of whether text is ambiguous). See Jack L. Landau, Oregon as a Laboratory
of Statutory Interpretation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 566–67 (2011).
See Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1145–46 (Or. 1993).
See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1779–80 (2010); Landau,
supra note 87, at 568.
OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020 (1) (b) (2001) (“To assist a court in its construction of a statute, a
party may offer the legislative history of the statute.”).
See Gluck, supra note 89, at 1783 n.115 (“Even a casual review of available online Oregon
Supreme Court briefs . . . reveals a substantial number that addressed the possible conflict
between the legislated rule and PGE.”).
206 P.3d 1042, 1047–51 (Or. 2009).
See id. at 1050. The Court noted that the legislature “also intended the court to retain the
authority to determine, as a discretionary matter, what weight, if any, to give that legislative
history,” although it was no longer limited to considering such history in cases where it
found the text ambiguous. Id.
See, e.g., State v. McNally, 392 P.3d 721, 728 (Or. 2017) (“To that end, we note that
dictionaries do not tell the whole story of statutory interpretation. . . . Rather, context and
legislative history also inform our view of the meaning of the words used.”); Brown v. SAIF
Corp., 391 P.3d 773, 792–93 (Or. 2017) (“More importantly, other legislative history
confirms that, contrary to that court’s reading of the statute, the legislature affirmatively
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dialogue may well continue in the future; legislators in 2013 introduced a bill to
require that courts consider legislative history when construing a statute,
specifying what types of materials constitute legislative history.95
This protracted interbranch exchange in Oregon has turned out to be more
cooperative than confrontational. Similar institutional exchanges addressing
courts’ interpretive methodology have been less amicable in some other states.96
While judicial bristling over enacted canons is perhaps understandable given
that legislatures are instructing courts in how to do their job, such resistance is
offered as part of an informal yet consciously responsive communication
between the two branches: In a word, it is dialogue.
There are also numerous examples of back and forth exchanges at the state
level in which the two branches explicitly resolve their differences on substantive
matters of statutory interpretation rather than methodology. In one instance,
the California Supreme Court concluded that although an elderly parent was
deemed “in need” of public assistance to the aged under the state welfare law, her
adult children owed her no duty of support as a “poor person” under a separate
civil code provision of state law.97 The legislature then amended the civil code
provision, replacing the words “poor person” with the words “any person in
need.”98 Two years later, the California Supreme Court expressly noted that the
legislature was responding to its earlier decision and held that the law now
coherently imposed a duty of support on adult children to elderly persons
receiving aid.99
In another example, the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho legislature
engaged in an extended exchange regarding when attorney’s fees should be
awarded in civil cases.100 A 1976 Idaho law had committed the decision to award

intended that employers be authorized to deny combined condition claims when the
medical conditions that they previously accepted ceased to be the major cause of the
combined conditions.”); State v. Makin, 381 P.3d 799, 801 (Or. 2016) (“In analyzing that
[statutory] question, we employ our familiar methodology. We look to the text, context, and
legislative history . . . to determine the legislature’s intent.”).
95. See S.B. 289, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013) (identifying “legislative history that
may be offered by party includes, but is not limited to, floor speeches, testimony and
member statements in committees, staff measure summaries, fiscal impact statements,
revenue impact statements and budget reports”).
96. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 89, at 1785–97 (describing courts’ hostile reactions to legislated
interpretive rules in Connecticut and Texas).
97. See County of San Mateo v. Boss, 479 P.2d 654, 659 (Cal. 1971).
98. See California Welfare Reform Act of 1971, ch.578, § 3, Stats. 1971.
99. Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 846 (Cal. 1973). The court in Swoap went on to hold
that the amended section was constitutional. Id. at 852. See LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 36 (2002).
100. See Hoffer v. Shappard, 380 P.3d 681, 694–96 (Idaho 2016).
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attorney fees to the sound discretion of the court,101 but a 1979 court rule limited
judicial discretion to instances where a case was “brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”102 In 1987, the legislature
added an unrelated sentence to the attorney’s fee law, along with an enacted but
uncodified statement of legislative intent that prevailing civil litigants be made
whole for attorney’s fees “when justice so requires.”103
In 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court in Hoffer v. Shappard announced that it
“was unable to continue to ignore the clear intent of the Legislature by
continuing to apply the court rule,” and that in the near future the courts of the
state would apply the “when justice so requires” standard.104 At the same time,
the court delayed the effective date of its new ruling for five months, allowing the
lower courts and the bar time to adjust and also allowing the legislature time to
respond.105 The legislature did respond, revising the law to match the
“frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation” language of the 1979 court
rule.106 Thus, after the court changed its institutional position in a conscious
effort to conform to the legislature’s previously enacted expansive intent, the
legislature altered its prior position to legitimize the court’s earlier constraining
gloss on the statutory text.
Rather than describe in detail additional state law examples,107 we hope we
have amply illustrated how legislatures and courts engage in prolonged selfconscious dialogue about matters of statutory interpretation on a relatively
unstructured and ad hoc basis. Returning for a moment to our earlier federal
example involving Congress’s rejection of two Supreme Court decisions
construing the same text, even these consecutive legislative overrides reflect
responsive engagement.108 As we observed, the second congressional override,

101. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-121 (West 2018).
102. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(e)(2).
103. Act of April 1, 1987, ch. 263, § 1, 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws 555 (“It is the intent of the legislature
of the state of Idaho that this act grant prevailing litigants in civil actions the right to be made
whole for attorney’s fees and costs when justice so requires.”).
104. Hoffer, 380 P.3d at 696.
105. See id.
106. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-121 (West 2018).
107. One more. In Estabrook v. American Hoist & Derrick, Inc., 498 A.2d 741, 745, 748–50 (N.H.
1985), the New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed constitutional objections to a state
workers compensation law. It explored legislative history in detail, recognizing that the
legislature had made changes to accommodate judicial concerns. Although the legislature’s
good faith effort was not successful in the court’s view, it still engaged in a kind of responsive
communication. See LANGER, supra note 99, at 35.
108. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 80–81, reviewing congressional responses to
decisions in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 424 U.S. 192 (1977), and Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
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again rejecting the Court’s interpretation of what constitutes a “subterfuge”
under the ADEA, was confrontational and somewhat surly on Congress’s part.109
Yet ultimately, Congress adjusted its statutory language to do what the Court
had asked, clarifying the ADEA text by expunging entirely the word “subterfuge”
and adding a new section that expressly required an employee benefit plan to
comply with the ADEA regardless of the date of the plan’s adoption.110
That an interaction may begin with a signal or command from a court,
without a request for response or acknowledgement from the legislature, is not
necessarily the end of the matter. One branch issuing a signal or command as to
statutory meaning can and often does trigger an institutional response leading to
further interbranch exchanges, with both court and legislature reiterating,
modulating, or abandoning earlier seemingly directive expressions.
C.

Formal Dialogue: Invitations and Requests

Beyond these relatively unstructured and informally developing
conversations over time, more formal versions of interbranch dialogue can
occur through express solicitation or invitation for an engaged response. A
familiar example at the federal level is Supreme Court invitations to Congress to
override the Court’s statutory decisions.111 One classic instance is McCarty v.
McCarty in which the Court held that upon dissolution of a marriage, federal law
precluded a state court from dividing military retirement pay pursuant to state
community property laws.112 At the end of his majority opinion, Justice
Blackmun expressed concern about the policy implications of the law as written
and construed, and he suggested that Congress consider a change:
We recognize that the plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service
member is often a serious one . . . . Congress may well decide, as it
has in the Civil Service and Foreign Service contexts, that more

109. See supra note 81 (quoting from Senate committee report); Brudney, Congressional
Commentary, supra note 68, at 17 n.60 (describing extent of bipartisan support for second
override).
110. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978, 978–81
(1990). These changes were fully responsive to the Court’s twice-expressed position on
whether an employee benefit plan may be exempt by virtue of its pre–ADEA (Age
Discrimination Employment Act) adoption.
111. See Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme
Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 166 (1999) (identifying
forty-two invitations to override in the 1986–1990 terms).
112. 453 U.S. 210, 232–35 (1981).
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protection should be afforded a former spouse of a retired service
member. This decision, however, is for Congress alone.113

In 1982, Congress responded by passing the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses’ Protection Act, overriding the Court’s decision by specifying that a state
may treat veterans’ “disposable retired . . . pay” as community property divisible
upon divorce.114
The Court’s strong invitation to override in McCarty is far from unusual. A
leading study found that 7.8 percent of the Court’s majority opinions in statutory
decisions during the 1986–2000 terms—more than seventy majorities—
included similarly strong invitations.115 In addition, majority opinions have
included weaker invitations to override, in which the Court does not see a policy
concern with its interpretation but recognizes that Congress may have wanted to
do more than the text provides.116
Not every majority invitation results in an override statute such as occurred
following McCarty. Still, Congress is more likely to override when the Court has
invited such action.117 The causal link between invitations and overrides may be
because the invitations themselves encourage Congress to act; alternatively, the
invitations may reflect the Court’s awareness that interest groups are already
mobilizing in anticipation of its decision.118 Either way, the fact that these
113. Id. at 235–36.
114. Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002 (1982) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2012)). See Howell v.
Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1403 (2017) (summarizing this sequence of events). The Senate
Committee Report makes clear that Congress was responding specifically to Justice
Blackmun’s invitation rather than more generally to the decision at large. See S. REP. NO.
97-502, at 1–3, 7–8 (1982), 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1596, 1596–97, 1601–03. See generally H.R.
REP. NO. 97-479, at 165–68 (1982) (Conf. Rep.).
115. See Lawrence Baum & Lori Hausegger, The Supreme Court and Congress: Reconsidering the
Relationship, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 107, 112
(Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004). Baum and Hausegger define “strong” invitations
as consisting of “statements that the statute as interpreted by the Court creates a problem,
or saying that Congress can act if it disagrees with the Court . . . [or that] there is a need for
Congress to consider action in response to the decision.” Id. at 112. For instances drawn
from their dataset of “strong invitations,” see, for example, Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40–41 (1998); Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 628–29 (1997); John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings
Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 110 (1993); and Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594 (1989).
116. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 27 (2000) (“Absent clear statement by
Congress, we will not read the mail fraud statute to place under federal superintendence a
vast array of conduct traditionally policed by the States.”). Even here, the Court, aware that
its prior interpretation of the same criminal law statute had triggered an override, invites
further institutional dialogue: “[A]gain, as we said in McNally, if Congress desires to go
further, it must speak more clearly than it has.” Id. at 20.
117. See Baum & Hausegger, supra note 115, at 112–13; Hausegger & Baum, supra note 111, at
167.
118. See Baum & Hausegger, supra note 115, at 113; Hausegger & Baum, supra note 111, at 167.
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majority invitations are correlated with congressional action to reverse the
Court’s decision strongly suggests that the branches are routinely engaged in
responsive communication.
There are also numerous instances of invitations to override issued by
justices in dissent, and these too may be taken up by Congress.119 Although we
focus on invitations in majority opinions because they reflect institutional
positions, it is clear that dissenting justices communicate in their traditional
institutional capacity as judges. Their interpretive analysis in a case-specific
opinion is what generates congressional interest; that Congress responds with
some frequency to these dissenters’ invitations reinforces the fact that Congress
is engaged with what the Court has to say.120 Moreover, while we have discussed
these invitations at the federal level, state courts also frequently invite legislatures
to override their decisions.121
Courts may have a range of motivations for inviting overrides. They may
be more comfortable allowing the legislature to supplant its interpretation by
changing policy; or they may be uncertain of (or less interested in) the best course
regarding a complex technical issue; or they may be hedging their bets in order
to reduce criticism from the legislature and interest groups.122 But assuming that
judges sometimes have multiple motives when issuing invitations, or that they

119. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting), overridden by Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat.
5 (2009); W. Va. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113–16 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
overridden by 1991 Civil Rights Act § 113.
120. Indeed, there is evidence that overrides are generally more likely when the Court is not
unanimous; the presence of a dissent may serve as an indication to Congress that the Court
has perhaps reached a bad policy result. See Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the
Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in GREAT THEATER: THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990S 224, 240–41 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson
eds., 1998).
121. For a very recent illustration, see New Hampshire v. Blanchette, No. 2016-0313, 2017 N.H.
LEXIS 111 (N.H. May 15, 2017) (overturning conviction of county law enforcement officer
based on ambiguity in state law barring individuals employed by correctional institutions
from having sex with inmates, and inviting state legislators to clarify the law for future cases
because both state and defense had presented plausible arguments). For an earlier example,
see In re Sarah K., 487 N.E.2d 241, 251 (N.Y. 1985) (inviting New York legislature to
reexamine its private placement adoption statute following 13 years of operation, “for it
appears that the well-founded concerns that engendered the law are not yet dispelled”). The
statute was amended the following year in response to the request of the Court of Appeals.
See Kaye, supra note 52, at 23–24 & n.129.
122. See Baum & Hausegger, supra note 115, at 120; Hausegger & Baum, supra note 111, at 170–
74, 178–82. See also Nancy C. Straudt et al., Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional
Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1363–65 (2007)
(discussing Supreme Court justices’ varied motivations for inviting overrides in tax law
setting).
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consider additional audiences besides the legislature, this does not diminish or
detract from the court’s expressed interest in eliciting a response from the
legislature on matters squarely within the legislative domain. The branches can
engage one another in dialogue based on multiple motivations and recognizing
additional audiences, just as individuals do when participating in a dialogue.
Another example of formal interbranch dialogue, initiated by legislatures
rather than courts, is requests for advisory opinions at the state level. In at least
twelve states, justices are authorized to issue advisory opinions to the legislative
or executive branches.123 Typically, legislatures ask whether a prospective piece
of legislation would pass constitutional muster, or they request the justices to
clarify a previous ruling.124
Advisory opinions are a structured mechanism of communication between
legislatures and the justices of supreme courts. Unlike the “hard-form” judicial
review that occurs in the federal constitutional setting, these opinions are
nonbinding, based on the well-settled practice that justices issue them in
their individual capacities rather than as courts of law.125 The justices “do not
speak ex cathedra, from the chair of judgment, but only as consultors . . . [and]
however sound the opinion may be, it carries no mandate.”126 Although these
opinions may eventually evolve into decisions that qualify as binding
precedent, they themselves are not the final word. Accordingly, advisory
responses to legislatures’ requests for guidance or clarification are typically
followed by legislative action that extends the interbranch conversation. Several
examples highlight the nature of this ongoing dialogue, in which judicial
responses and subsequent exchanges may reflect interbranch disagreement,
harmonious collaboration, or even abandonment of interbranch engagement.
In 2002, the Alabama legislature was considering a bill that permitted
certain sparsely populated municipalities to determine by “local option” election
whether to permit the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages.127 Concerned

123. See Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117, 120 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (citing ROBERT
T. ROPER ET AL., CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS & NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
1984 APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION GUIDE FOR STATISTICAL REPORTING: SUMMARY TABLES
34–45 (1984)). In two of those states, South Dakota and Florida, courts may issue advisory
opinions in cases within their discretionary subject matter jurisdiction only to the governor.
Id.
124. See MARK C. MILLER, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 245 (2015).
125. See Jonathan D. Persky, “Ghosts That Slay”: A Contemporary Look at State Advisory
Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155, 1209 (2005); Mel A. Topf, State Supreme Court Advisory
Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 101, 106.
126. Opinion to the Governor, 174 A.2d 553, 554 (R.I. 1961).
127. See S.B. 539, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002).
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that the bill might conflict with certain sections of the state constitution, the
legislature requested an advisory opinion from the Alabama Supreme Court.128
The justices issued their advisory opinion a short time later; they concluded that
the statutory drafting by Alabama’s legislature would, if enacted, be a violation
of the state constitution.129
Within just over a year, the Alabama legislature enacted a law substantially
identical to its 2002 bill, except that the legislature added a provision
acknowledging the advisory opinion but disagreeing with the conclusion the
justices had reached about its statute’s legal effect.130 The legislature maintained
that its new statute was constitutional “as a matter of law” under the power
granted to it by a different section of the constitution.131 A qualified small
municipality then scheduled a “local option” election, in which citizens voted by
almost 3 to 1 to allow liquor sales. The town was sued by concerned citizens, but
the Alabama Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had not established an actual
injury and therefore lacked standing to challenge either the election results or the
new law’s constitutionality.132 Thus, although the legislature sought guidance
from the justices and understood how it had been advised, the legislature
disagreed with that advice—and its statutory reply has remained in place.
Another example comes from Massachusetts. There, two at-will
employees who worked at a local greyhound track were fired for refusing to work
on Christmas Day. They sued, alleging religious discrimination. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that the applicable state
religious rights statute, which protected “the practice of a creed or religion as
required by that creed or religion,”133 violated the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause by preferring the religions or beliefs of an organized sect
or church over those of an individual.134 The Massachusetts House of
Representatives then asked the SJC for an advisory opinion on a new bill that
included amendments to the statute prohibiting religious discrimination in the
workplace.135 The justices responded that the proposed amendment would

128. See H.R. Res. 383, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002).
129. See Opinion of the Justices, 825 So.2d 109, 115–16 (Ala. 2002).
130. S.B. 362, 2003 Reg. Sess., 2003 Ala. Laws 1011. See also Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens
Caring for Children, 904 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Ala. 2004).
131. See Town of Cedar Bluff, 904 So.2d at 1255.
132. See id. at 1259.
133. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1A) (2016) (emphasis added).
134. See Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E. 2d 1298, 1302–03 (Mass. 1996).
135. See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 673 N.E. 2d 36, 36 (Mass. 1996).
The bill, responding to Pielech, added a sentence to § 4(1A) providing that “the words creed
or religion means any sincerely held religious beliefs, without regard to whether such beliefs
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remove the constitutional violation found in its prior Pielech opinion;136 the
legislature then amended the law using the precise language approved in the
advisory opinion.137 In this instance, dialogue resulted in agreement between the
branches, as the legislature accepted and acted on the advice from the justices,
using their actual language in its statutory drafting.
Finally, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in a 1997 decision,
invalidated the state’s system for financing elementary and secondary education,
and required remedial legislation to address the constitutional infirmity
concerning property taxes and school funding.138 In response, the legislature
requested several advisory opinions on remedial legislation it proposed in 1998,
1999, and 2000. The justices in three separate advisory opinions opined that each
of the proposed solutions was insufficient.139 Following this extended back and
forth between the branches, the issue of school funding equality identified by the
Supreme Court remained unremedied.140
Evidence suggests that in recent times, legislatures in states where advisory
opinions are authorized have been requesting fewer advisory opinions than in
earlier periods, and accordingly, courts are issuing fewer opinions.141 Still, the
advisory opinion serves as a mechanism for dialogue and continues to be

136.
137.
138.
139.

140.
141.

are approved, espoused, prescribed, or required by any established church or other religious
institution or organization.” Id. at 36–37.
See id. at 37–38. The justices chose not to respond to a related request from the legislature
as to whether a retroactivity clause for this new provision would be constitutional; they
opined that a definitive answer would depend on the facts of each case. Id. at 38.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1A) (2016).
See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1354, 1360–61 (N.H.
1997).
See Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), 712 A.2d 1080, 1086–87 (N.H. 1998)
(opining that bill providing for a proportional tax rate minus a selective tax abatement for
certain communities does not remedy the constitutional defect identified in Claremont II);
Opinion of the Justices (Tax Plan Referendum), 725 A.2d 1082, 1092 (N.H. 1999) (opining
that bill providing for submission of school tax issue to the electorate in a referendum would
be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Opinion of the Justices (Reformed
Public School Financing System), 765 A.2d 673, 676–77 (N.H. 2000) (opining that new
proposed bill retained a disproportionate property tax scheme that was found
unconstitutional in Claremont II).
In some states, supreme court rulings on educational funding have led legislatures to make
substantial changes in school finance and related educational reforms. See MILLER, supra
note 124, at 246 (reporting changes by legislatures in Kentucky, Vermont, and Maine).
See Persky, supra note 125, at 1181–84 (comparing advisory opinion activity from 1990–
2004 with activity from 1960–1973, and reporting that acceptance rate of advisory opinion
requests has fallen from 89 percent to 81 percent, answer rate on advisory questions has
fallen from 84 percent to 61 percent, and number of requests submitted to the justices has
declined by more than half).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237833

378

66 UCLA L. R EV. 346 (2019)

invoked with some frequency.142 Most relevant for our purposes, it provides a
mechanism by which the legislature “can test the waters with borderline
proposals without subjecting the public to reliance costs,” and the judiciary can
respond to these proposals on an expeditious basis.143 As our examples indicate,
the results of these interbranch conversations may be respectful disagreement
(as in Alabama), collaborative agreement (as in Massachusetts), or an
inconclusive middle ground (as in New Hampshire). Whatever the results,
though, advisory opinions at the state level reflect a conscious reciprocal
engagement between the branches.
D.

Additional Interbranch Mechanisms

We have discussed the principal informal and formal mechanisms that
reflect ongoing responsive communication between legislatures and courts,
what we think we can fairly call interbranch dialogue. Other modes of
institutional expression may qualify as dialogue on a more occasional basis,
depending on where they fall on the rough continuum between signals and
exchanges. Some of these emanate initially from legislatures and others from the
courts. We address them below, albeit in more summary fashion than the
primary mechanisms analyzed in our two previous Subparts.
1.

Legislated Canons of Interpretation

If canons of interpretation are a form of methodological common law, then
enacted canons arguably indicate a displacement of that common law in relevant
respects.144 Beyond the extended dialogue over Oregon’s “pursue the intention of
the legislature” canon described earlier,145 there is a fair degree of consensus among
state legislatures regarding the codification or rejection of certain canons.146 Some
of these codifications have led to extended interbranch exchanges in states

142. See id. at 1184 (reporting 143 advisory opinion responses between 1990 and 2004 in ten
studied states).
143. Id. at 1203–04.
144. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L.J. 341 (2010) (collecting and categorizing the statutory canons for all fifty states and the
District of Columbia).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 86–96.
146. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 144, at 378, 429 (reporting that 26 states have codified the canon
of consistency between statutes/in pari materia, and none have rejected it by code); id. at
402, 431 (reporting that twenty states have codified the canon that remedial statutes should
be liberally construed while nineteen of those twenty states have codified a rejection of the
canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed).
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besides Oregon.147 Yet while one might assume that judicial interpretation of
statutes should be informed, if not influenced, by such prevailing patterns of
codification,148 these legislatively expressed preferences trench on an interpretive
domain that tends to be zealously guarded by the courts for separation of powers
reasons. Accordingly, they may engender little or no genuinely responsive
interaction. Insofar as legislated canons and judicial reliance on common law
canons often appear like two ships passing in the night, the concept of dialogue has
less persuasive resonance here as a general matter—though exceptions appear
from time to time.
2.

Legislators’ Amicus Briefs

Taking the federal level as our example, members of Congress often
participate in amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court.149 The briefs are efforts
by legislators to explain the meaning of federal statutes and to support federal
legislation under review by the Court, including when the executive branch does
a less than adequate job of defending or enforcing the legislation.150 Amicus
participation by members of Congress may enhance the Court’s appreciation for
certain policy issues151 and also its understanding of legislative intent as
expressed in the legislative history accompanying a particular statute.
On the other hand, it is not clear that these amicus briefs function as
responsive institutional communication, which is the way we defined interbranch
dialogue in Subpart II.A. For one thing, legislators are communicating not in
their traditional institutional capacities through approval of statutory text and
related legislative history but as advocates or commentators reviewing an
earlier legislative product.152 Further, members participate as individual legislators
rather than as the institution of Senate or House. While individual participation
on a large-scale bipartisan basis could be viewed as a proxy for some form of
147. See generally Gluck, supra note 89, at 1785–811 (reporting on extended exchanges that have
occurred in Texas, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Michigan).
148. See Scott, supra note 144, at 409.
149. See JUDITHANNE SCOURFIELD MCLAUCHLAN, CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION AS AMICUS
CURIAE BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2005); Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization
in Congress: Lessons From Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 933 (2015).
150. See MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 149, at 213.
151. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993) (citing congressional amicus brief,
among others, as providing evidence that hate crimes “are more likely to provoke retaliatory
crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest”).
152. In this respect, amicus briefs may be more analogous to State of the Judiciary Addresses,
discussed infra in text accompanying notes 161–166, than to invitations to override issued
by individual dissenting justices, supra note 119.
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institutional expression, lawmakers in today’s polarized Congress rarely if ever file
bipartisan amicus briefs.153 Institutional counsel for the House or the Senate might
file briefs, as they have defending congressional prerogatives in separation of
powers disputes before the Court. Since the mid–1990s, however, members of
Congress have ceased to cooperate across partisan lines on these institutional
briefs as well.154
Their status as post-enactment commentary, along with the lack of a
consistently unified institutional voice, presumably help account for the fact that
in empirical terms, amicus briefs filed by legislators are not especially influential
on the Court.155
3.

Judicial Stays of Mandate

One mechanism a court may use to communicate with the legislature is to
stay its mandate accompanying a decision that substantially alters prior
statutorily created expectations. Delaying the effective date of such a decision
invites the legislature to respond by adjusting the new statutory reality so as to
minimize reliance costs for affected interest groups or members of the public.
One example is the Idaho Supreme Court decision altering the standard for
awarding attorney’s fees we explored earlier: its announcement of a five month
delay enabled the legislature to adjust the law.156 Another instance, at the federal
level, involved the Supreme Court in 1982 staying its mandate for six months so
that Congress could have time to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or
otherwise repair operation of the bankruptcy laws.157 Notwithstanding these

153. See Devins, supra note 149, at 933–35. In addition to the individual and partisan nature of
these amicus briefs, members often do not review the briefs themselves, as most of the work
related to amicus participation is done at the staff level. See MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 149,
at 22. This, of course, is also true of drafting statutory text, but unlike amicus briefs,
members vote on proposed statutory text, and they generally do so following a detailed
explanation from relevant staff and having been lobbied from interest groups on both sides.
See generally KATZMANN, supra note 11, at 14–22.
154. See Devins supra note 149, at 951–52 (reporting that in the Defense of Marriage Act case
before the Supreme Court, the House Democrats filed an amicus brief criticizing the House
counsel’s defense of the statute; and in a case challenging the scope of the president’s recess
appointments powers, the Senate counsel was silent while Senate Republicans filed amicus
briefs arguing against the executive branch position).
155. See MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 149, at 36, 210 (finding that the Justices rarely cite to
congressional amicus briefs, and that members of Congress success rate before the Court
(54 percent) is lower than the rate for the Solicitor General and many interest groups);
Devins, supra note 149, at 935.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 100–106.
157. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982).
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two examples of such judicially announced delay, we are doubtful that this
judicial mechanism is used all that often.
An interesting corollary may be the executive branch delaying enforcement
of a major judicially-created change in statutory scope, with the aim of allowing
the legislature to respond to the court’s decision. This is what occurred following
the Supreme Court decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, which restored the applicability of federal statutory overtime
protections for millions of police, firefighters, and other public employees.158
Although the Court’s decision became effective on April 15, 1985, when
rehearing was denied, the Labor Department announced that local and state
governments would not be required to comply until October 15, six months
later.159 In the interim, Congress enacted legislation that responded to Garcia by
providing for compensatory time instead of overtime for public employees.160
4.

Judicial Presentations and Testimony to Legislatures

Presentations to the legislature by the chief justice of state supreme courts
are a further indication at the state level that courts and legislatures converse on
a frequent basis. More than forty states have used this mechanism to facilitate
interbranch communications.161 Although chief justices typically discuss
financial and administrative needs of the judicial branch, they also may raise
issues of substantive law reform. For instance, in February 2017, the Chief
Justice in Texas used his address to advocate for a bill aimed at overhauling
Texas’s bail system and also to point out that over the previous year more than
600,000 defendants had gone to jail for traffic, parking, and other minor
offenses.162 Since his address, the state Senate approved a bail reform bill that is
likely to allow more nonviolent offenders to be released while they await trial,163

158. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
159. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Is Assailed on Overtime Issue, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 1985),
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/26/us/court-is-assailed-on-overtime-issue.html;
Kenneth B. Noble, U.S. Drafting Overtime Pay Code to Cover State and City Workers, N.Y.
TIMES (June 14, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/14/us/us-drafting-overtime-paycode-to-cover-state-and-city-workers.html.
160. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (1985).
161. See Interbranch Relations, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/CourtManagement/Interbranch-Relations/State-Links.aspx
[https://perma.cc/G2E7-88QV]
(providing links to State of the Judiciary messages for 43 states).
162. See Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice of the State of the Judiciary in Texas, Address to the 85th
Texas Legislature 7–8 (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1437289/soj-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6XW-LLQL].
163. See Mike Ward & Brian Rogers, Senate Approves Bail Reform Bill as Pressure Mounts for
Harris County to Settle Lawsuit, HOUS. CHRON. (May 4, 2017, 8:57 PM),
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and the full legislature enacted a law requiring local courts to offer alternatives to
jail time for individuals who cannot afford to pay traffic tickets and other minor
fines.164 There was pressure in Texas to deal with these issues before the Chief
Justice’s address,165 but it seems plausible to infer that his communication helped
encourage the legislature to act.
There have been other instances when annual addresses from a chief justice
have raised issues of public policy for legislators to consider.166 That said, as we
noted above, the main thrust of these addresses seems to be on matters of judicial
management and finances, and it is not clear how often the policy matters raised
by the chief justices trigger a responsive exchange from the legislature.
At the federal level, Senate confirmation hearings in recent decades often
involve exchanges between judicial nominees and legislators about the judicial
role in interpreting statutes. These exchanges are most likely to occur for
Supreme Court nominees;167 while they at times appear to stem from instrumental
or strategic motives, there are moments when genuine conversation seems to
take place.168

164.
165.
166.

167.

168.

https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Senateapproves-bail-reform-bill-as-pressure-11122889.php [https://perma.cc/T6Y6-7M4S].
See Ryan Kocian, Texas Reforms Its System of Debtors’ Prisons, COURTHOUSE NEWS (June
20, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/texas-reforms-system-debtors-prisons
[https://perma.cc/7RVX-XGL9].
See generally Leif Reigstad, Texas Has a Debtor’s Prison Problem, TEX. MONTHLY (Aug. 19,
2016), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-daily-post/texas-debtors-prisons-problem
[https://perma.cc/MR3L-P99A].
See, e.g., Press Release, Patricia Breckenridge, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, Missouri’s Chief Justice Delivers 2017 State of the Judiciary Address (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=109214 (urging inter alia caution over proposals to
change the state’s tort law); Leigh I. Saufley, Chief Justice of Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
The State of the Judiciary: A Report to the Joint Convention of the First Regular Session
128th Maine Legislature (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.courts.maine.gov/
maine_courts/supreme/speeches/SoJ-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A9S-VGNM] (focusing
inter alia on the addiction crisis and domestic violence).
Since the 1980s, a number of Senators on the Judiciary Committee have urged judges to pay
attention to legislative history when interpreting federal statutes. See, e.g., Nomination of
Stephen G. Breyer to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 170–74 (1994) (remarks of Senator
Grassley); Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 223–25, 325–
26 (1993) (remarks of Senator Cohen and Senator DeConcini).
See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (statement of
Chief Justice John Roberts) (2005) (reporting that judges have the limited role of umpires,
whose job is to see that everyone plays by the rules, and that “[n]obody ever went to a ball
game to see the umpire”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 202–03 (2010) (statement of Justice Elena Kagan) (reporting that
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Conduct by individual judiciary committee members in confirmation
hearings is not directly attributable to Congress as an institution. Nonetheless,
as was true for Supreme Court dissents urging Congress to override, individual
legislators may engage judicial nominees in responsive communication. To be
sure, this communication may be influenced by the realities of partisan
alignment—as is also the case when a dissenting justice’s invitation to override
may await a shift in institutional control.169
5.

Canons That Presume Interbranch Communication

Courts interpreting statutes invoke a range of canons that assume
legislatures pay attention and will respond accordingly. One notable example is
“clear statement” canons. In the federal system, if Congress wants a law to
preempt an area of traditional state regulation, it must do so in a clear manner.170
Similarly, if Congress wishes its statutes to apply extraterritorially, it must clearly
say so.171 The recently popular “dog didn’t bark” canon also presupposes
Congress is listening, in that a court will not find a dramatic change to have been
made in a prior legal rule if the legislative history discloses that no member of
Congress discussed any changes in the rule or even mentioned the rule.172 And
the general principle of super-strong stare decisis for statutory decisions relies
on the conceit that legislatures pay attention to court decisions and (in contrast
to constitutional decisions) can change any interpretation they do not like.

169.

170.
171.
172.

Chief Justice Roberts’s umpire metaphor is correct in important respects, including the
judge not having a team in the game and judges realizing that their role is a limited one
because the real policymakers are in Congress and the executive branch; adding that the calls
justices make are not easy ones and their exercise of judgment requires listening hard to each
side and “cast[ing] each argument in the best possible light”); Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 155–56 (March 21, 2017) (exchange
between Justice Neil Gorsuch and Senator Amy Klobuchar on whether Justice Gorsuch’s
appeals court opinions suggest a strong inclination to replace Chevron deference with
Skidmore deference or something else closer to de novo judicial review).
See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing Congress took several years to muster a political majority for the
1991 Civil Rights Act, and observing: “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991,
the Legislature may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”).
See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2188–89 (2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 91 (2007); Chisom v. Roemer,
501 US 380, 396 & n.23 (1991); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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These and similar canons rely on the notion that legislatures will respond
to signals sent by the judicial branch because it is aware of them as part of
interbranch communication. There is modest empirical support for the
proposition that Congress pays attention to some of these canons when it drafts
laws.173 Still, the fact that the legislature recognizes canons at a general level is not
quite the same as its responding to specific judicial invitations or decisions. Put
differently, the interaction initiated by courts through canons seems more like
an instance of interbranch signaling than the responsive exchanges we have
detailed earlier in this Part.174
6.

The Statutory Housekeeping Project

Finally, a project begun by Chief Judge Robert Katzmann in the 1990s
arranges for circuit court decisions identifying federal statutes with drafting
errors or gaps to be sent to offices of Congress, in the hope this will lead Congress
to respond by fixing the mistakes that the courts have identified.175 Congress’s
Office of Legislative Counsel has expressed appreciation for the chance to learn
about these prior drafting errors,176 so in one sense the project may be deemed an
effective communicative exercise. But while the circuits continue to send
published decisions to congressional committee and member offices, the offices
rarely respond.177 This may well be because the legislators or their staff are

173. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 942 (reporting that 80 percent of staff involved in
legislative drafting were familiar with presumption on preemption of traditional state
regulation, and the presumption plays some role in drafting for 65 percent of those who were
aware of it). But see id. at 943–44, 957 (reporting that majority of respondents did not view
clear statement presumptions as necessarily pointing in any particular direction—even
though that is their point as presumptions—and concluding that this majority view,
combined with a broader lack of congressional awareness of most clear statement rules,
undermines the argument that courts should invoke them as interpretive norms).
174. In the same way, the doctrine that courts may draw inferences from legislative silence
regarding their prior statutory constructions also bears more resemblance to interbranch
signaling than responsive communication. For an illustration of this point in a classic
controversial case, compare Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 74–75 (1946) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (contending that Congress’s failure to overturn three prior Supreme Court
statutory decisions after considering such an override for six successive Congresses signals
legislative approval), with id. at 69–70 (Douglas, J., majority) (holding that Congress’s
concededly conscious inaction was “as consistent with a desire to leave the problem fluid
as . . . with an adoption by silence of the rule of those cases”).
175. See Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for “Statutory Housekeeping”:
Appellate Courts Working With Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 131, 133 (2007); Jeff
Simard, Note, Stimulating Dialogue Between the Courts and Congress: Sprucing Up the
“Statutory Housekeeping” Project, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1195, 1199–204 (2015).
176. See id. at 1216.
177. See id. at 1205–09, 1214–17.
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comfortable with the appeals court resolutions. Whatever the explanation, we
have elsewhere characterized the statutory housekeeping project as more of a
one-way transmission belt than a genuine dialogue.178
The mechanisms described in this Subpart represent a rich set of
interactions between the legislative and judicial branches. The interactions are
predicated on the reality that the two branches frequently converse with one
another. As we have indicated, these particular communications, initiated by
legislatures or courts, may often operate in practice as signals more than ongoing
responsive exchanges. At the same time, their sheer volume and diversity
reinforce the persuasiveness of the principal dialogic mechanisms described in
Subparts II.B and II.C.
E.

Proximate Equality and Institutional Identity

Several scholars suggest genuine dialogue between institutions requires
that the parties be of comparable authority or power, if not actually equals.179
The legislative and judicial branches are deemed formally “co-equal” under our
separation of powers structure, but within constitutional law, judicial supremacy
is a commonly held norm,180 and courts are viewed as better equipped to protect
core rights against legislative incursion.181 By contrast, when it comes to the
meaning of statutes, while neither branch’s interpretive moves are necessarily
the final word, legislatures often act to protect or reestablish rights after courts
have found textual or canonical reasons to limit them.182
Common wisdom suggests that “in the domain of statutory interpretation,
Congress is the master.”183 Although legislative acts—even acts approving or
disapproving court decisions—remain subject to subsequent judicial constraint
or expansion, courts tend to recognize and understand that in a democratic

178. See Leib & Brudney, supra note 73, at 1560.
179. See, e.g., Hogg & Bushell, supra note 5, at 79–80; Tremblay, supra note 85, at 630.
180. See Waldron, supra note 5, at 8 (describing the widely held position that “judges in their
wisdom have little to learn and nothing to reconsider in light of the legislature’s amateurish
observations about how best to understand constitutional structures and restraints”).
181. See Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues About Rights: The
Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 537, 543 (2005); Waldron, supra note 5, at 42.
182. Among recent examples one might point to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 override
of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) Amendments Act of 2008 override of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184 (2002); and the 1991 Civil Rights Act override of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989), West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), and
numerous other decisions.
183. Casey, 499 U.S. at 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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republic, the legislature has and should have controlling influence over statutory
meaning. This may help explain why even justices associated with textualism
defer to the legislature’s design, purpose, or plan to help resolve the meaning of
inconclusive text.184
That said, overrides, underwrites, invitations to override, and requests for
advisory opinions all exemplify an ongoing conversation, a “[d]ialogue [that]
presupposes difference and disagreement.”185 Importantly, these mechanisms
often reflect interactive exchanges and adjustments over longer periods, not
simply one-off expressions of interbranch difference. At a provisional endpoint
in any such extended interaction, legislatures and courts may find themselves in
disagreement with one another, even on heated terms. While the provisional
final word generally reflects the legislature’s understanding of what its enacted
words and policies mean,186 there are occasions when the court’s understanding
effectively controls the legislative disposition of an institutional disagreement.187
Still, this interbranch discord is essentially dialogic in that it involves “reciprocal
respect for, and responsiveness to, opposing arguments regarding the issue
addressed.”188
Because interbranch dialogue can encompass communications extending
over years or decades, it implicates the question of whether legislatures and

184. See, for instance, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinions in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(2015), and Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). See generally Abbe R. Gluck,
Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 64, 66 (2015).
185. Waldron, supra note 5, at 9. Even underwrites may exemplify this conception, inasmuch as
the Court is not estopped from construing an underwrite in ways that constrain or alter
Congress’s understanding of what it had endorsed. See, e.g., Leib & Brudney, supra note 73,
at 1496 n.18, 1502, 1543 (describing Congress’s 1972 underwrite of Griggs, as well as its
subsequent underwrite in 1991 responding to the Court’s 1989 decision in Wards Cove, 490
U.S. 642).
186. Examples include (1) the 1991 Civil Rights Act override of Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991),
establishing that prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions may recover the costs of expert
fees; (2) the override in the same Act of EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991), establishing the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Title VII; and (3) the 1994 Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act override of Ratzlaf v. United
States, 511 U.S. 571 (1994), establishing a broad definition of “structuring” violations under
the federal money-laundering statute.
187. Congress overrode the Betts decision (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 78–81)
in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, but did so in part by expunging the
word “subterfuge” from the text of the ADEA, thereby honoring, albeit grudgingly, the
Court’s insistence that this term did not mean what repeated legislative history explanations
said it meant.
188. See Tulis, supra note 2, at 201.
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courts should be thought of as having ongoing identities.189 The fact that these
institutions’ membership, official statuses, and political valences may change
with time does not mean they lack institutional continuity. For legislatures,
considerations of democratic legitimacy demand that the public be able to elect
new members at regular intervals, and that new and old members be amenable
to updating or reforming legislative policies. But even legislatures with new
political majorities are often circumspect about abandoning or rejecting
previously enacted policies, given the risks of upsetting the electorate’s
established or entrenched reliance interests.190
Judicial respect for legislative continuity over time is reflected in the
longstanding canon that disfavors repeals by implication.191 This canon has been
embraced with particular fervor by the Court in recent decades.192 It privileges
vertical coherence, or consistency of a statutory scheme over time, based on the
presumption of a “fixed and persistent institutional legislative will.”193 Similarly,
the principle of super-strong stare decisis for statutory decisions evinces an
appreciation for legislative continuity and consistency. Because Congress and
state legislatures have a reasonable opportunity to alter earlier judicial
interpretations of their statutory text, their failure to do so receives special
weight; this in turn enables legislatures to rely on judicial precedents when
building on an existing statutory scheme.194

189. See supra Subpart I.D. This question is distinct from whether the Senate is a “continuing
body” in a way that the House is not, because only one-third of its members are replaced in
a regular election cycle. See Bruhl, supra note 29. Although authority to enact introduced
bills, consent to judicial nominations, or vote on articles of impeachment lapses when the
Senate adjourns at the end of a legislative session, both the Senate and House retain their
institutional identities over time. Their roles continue as participants in dialogue with the
judiciary and the executive, even as the details of this dialogue may be altered by transitions
from one session of Congress to another.
190. See Mark Tushnet, Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339
(2008).
191. See, e.g., Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 133 (2003); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549–50 (1974); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350
(1963); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342, 343 n.3 (1842). For discussion, see Karen
Petroski, Reauthorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 487
(2004).
192. See id. at 539–40 (appendix of Supreme Court cases addressing implied repeals from 1809
to 2003 discloses that in 41 of 42 decisions from 1981 to 2003, the Court ruled against
implied repeals).
193. Id. at 524.
194. See Leib & Brudney, supra note 73, at 1537–38. See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,
1026 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the canon against implied repeals
“preserve[s] the intent of later Congresses that have already enacted laws that are dependent
on the continued applicability of the law whose implicit repeal is in question”).
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Members of Congress also understand and are committed to the idea of an
ongoing institutional identity. One example involves the system of permanent
standing committees, created by the membership in the earliest days of the
Republic to shape the priorities and agenda of each chamber.195 In contrast to
our British parliamentary forebearers, the American standing committee
approach involves bills being reviewed and reported by committees with
permanent subject matter jurisdiction and presumptively continuing leadership
and membership.196 Another illustration is when legislative floor managers
engage in structured colloquies that are meant to bring forward committee
explanations and justifications from earlier bills as reflecting the intent of later
versions.197
Continuity of the Supreme Court as an institution is not seriously
contested. Unlike Congress which is reconstituted in formal terms every two
years, the Court retains its unbroken identity over time. Despite changes in
membership, and scholarly or media conceptions of a Burger Court, a Rehnquist
Court, and a Roberts Court, bedrock notions of stare decisis and respect for the
rule of law reinforce the Court’s identity as a unitary institution across decades
and even centuries.198
Membership changes in both branches often result in considerable political
or ideological shifts. One party may wrest control of the Senate or House from
another, and one wing of the Court may cause a shift in jurisprudential priorities.
But as important as these individual developments are from a policy perspective,
they do not affect the institutional continuity of the two branches.
Finally, it is worth noting that institutional continuity in Congress and the
Court extends beyond those occupying primary membership.199 As an institution,
Congress includes thick professional networks that process relevant information
and manage the flow of communication. Legislative staff for standing committees
195. See generally DAVID T. CANON ET AL., 1 COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, 1789–1946 at
xxxviii (2002); WILLIAM L. MORROW, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 14–15 (1969).
196. See James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1221 (2010) (describing British parliamentary committee structure,
“which to this day relies on standing committees that lack permanent subject matter
jurisdiction [and] that are without continuing membership”).
197. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S8692 (daily ed. June 28, 1988) (colloquy between Senators
Metzenbaum and Durenberger incorporating, as part of explanation for 1988 bill about to
be approved by Senate, conference report discussions from earlier bill describing how
advance notice requirements for plant closing and mass layoffs would operate in practice).
Maybe these structured colloquies are most like Platonic dialogues!
198. See, e.g., PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 167 (2002) (“In social and
political discourse, institutions such as the Supreme Court of the United States . . . are
commonly treated as abstract entities with continuing identity over time.”).
199. We are grateful to Jeb Barnes for articulating and emphasizing this point to us.
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and individual members engage regularly (on their principals’ behalf) with
interest groups and executive agency personnel, addressing judicial precedent
among other factors that help shape the bills that become laws. These staff
members, along with professional drafters in legislative counsel offices, also
participate in drafting statutory text and committee reports that analyze and
respond to court decisions. In addition, analysts in the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) provide summaries of existing and proposed law, including
caselaw, all of which informs the lawmaking process.
The Court too is aided by its own professional network, albeit a thinner one
that consists primarily of law clerks but also of research librarians and lawyers
(notably in the Solicitor General’s office). Their research, briefs, and oral
arguments are meant to enhance the justices’ ability to interpret and apply
statutes by better understanding what Congress has said and meant. In sum,
interbranch dialogue, although focused primarily on the principal elected or
appointed actors from each branch, also incorporates the reality that both
institutions are porous as well as bounded, and that their porosity further
contributes to the quality and continuity of the dialogue, leading to deliberative
learning over time.
We have examined interbranch dialogue in a number of settings, in an
effort to demonstrate its conceptual plausibility, descriptive feasibility, and
pragmatic complexity, whatever one’s preferred interpretive method. As we
have shown, there are variations at both federal and state levels in terms of which
branch initiates conscious attempts at bilateral communication, in the number
of institutional exchanges that contribute to this dialogue, and in whether the
interactions end in mutually agreeable resolution or continue with dissonant
expressions of interpretive understanding. These and other variations illustrate
that when it comes to comprehending and applying statutory text, neither
branch predictably possesses the last word. If anything, their comparable levels
of authority and complementary rationality and policy expertise assure that their
continuing exchanges can give rise to what Henry Hart and Albert Sacks referred
to as “reasoned elaboration.”200

200. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 145–51 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (suggesting that legal decisionmaking must be informed by normative
considerations—such as values, purposes, and policies—that are immanent in all legal
materials, and also by a commitment to principles of basic fairness that can be inferred from
these materials or imputed to policymakers throughout the legal system).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237833

390

66 UCLA L. R EV. 346 (2019)

III.

IN DEFENSE OF INTERBRANCH DIALOGUE

Having just described and explored the various ways one can realistically
think about interbranch dialogue between legislatures and judiciaries,
addressing along the way many of the challenges against thinking in dialogic
terms we introduced in Part I, we are poised to offer a more clearly normative
gloss here. Now that we have established how interbranch dialogue goes well
beyond just posturing and signaling, and that productive dialogue takes place
under conditions considerably less restrictive than its critics suggest, it is easier
to understand why the metaphor has been powerful within statutory
interpretation for so long. Indeed, even efforts that can look strategic through
one lens can be usefully seen as dialogic when refracted through another; that
mixed motives are possible does not vitiate dialogue, deliberation, and learning
among institutions. And getting more careful about defining what counts as
dialogue, as we have in Part II, helps parry many of the critiques that center on
problems of unilateral signaling, collective intent, or the impersonality of
conversation among institutions and their membership. Yet apart from our
particular conception of dialogue, built on the foundation of actual institutional
practices and assumptions, a normative commitment to dialogue might be
sustained by other conceptions as well.
Thus, we conclude by reinforcing why interbranch dialogue is properly at
the center of thinking about statutory interpretation by judges, legislators, and
scholars. Specifically, what has not already been directly addressed in Part II are
potential rebuttals to the concerns about role responsibility we developed in
Subpart 1.F: that dialogue can threaten institutions by distracting them from
their primary obligations in a government of separated powers. Here, we put
front and center the ways interbranch dialogue supports institutions’
appropriate humility, leverages their comparative institutional competence, and
harnesses the benefits of deliberative engagement on matters of law and policy.
Conversely, the risks attendant to institutional hubris, the losses associated with
insensitivity to institutional competence, and the costs to policy refinement of
refusals to engage deliberatively in interbranch interactions all reinforce the
importance of interbranch dialogue as something more than a slogan. Indeed,
even those who remain skeptics about the conception of interbranch dialogue
we expose in Part II might still see some benefits in a fallback position: that the
coordinate branches ought to act “as if” they are in dialogue.201

201. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, AS IF: IDEALIZATION AND IDEALS (2017).
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Most importantly, thinking dialogically tends to promote appropriate
humility within each branch. This may seem counterintuitive, as the metaphor
of dialogue can be used in a way to aggrandize the power of one branch or
another rather than to diminish it.202 In some hands, the use of dialogic thinking
has been a way to prop up judicial supremacy203—and in others (especially
within constitutional law debates) as a way to double down on legislative
authority.204 Yet, when properly conceived and calibrated, thinking of statutory
interpretation as dialogue helps the two branches retain their respective
proximately equal status. While we emphasized this on a descriptive level in
Part II, here we spotlight its normative valence.
When a legislature imagines itself in conversation with downstream
implementers and interpreters, far from increasing its power as some fear, the
legislature is made aware that it needs judicial partners to make its policies effective.
Such thinking helps the legislature remember how critical communication is,
not only to those affected and coerced by its law but to judges as well. So too, judges
who remember that policy development in areas of statutory law must be
achieved together with legislators are more likely to approach their task with
an appropriate comportment to the job than those who imagine that they are
in conversation with no one but themselves.
The dialogic legislator and judge ultimately have a more deliberative vision
of their roles in a system of coordinate branches of government. To be sure, it
may be possible with other methods of institutional design to generate the
requisite humility without a dialogic approach to statutory interpretation. But
interbranch dialogue remains a useful, powerful, and coherent way to generate
the right kind of mentality and sensitivity, so essential to rational and
deliberative policy development.
This point trades on a conception of “deliberative democracy,” an account
of the legitimacy of democratic politics that, in part, evaluates a state’s right to
rule based on how well its decisionmaking can be said to be deliberative.205 There
is an anti-elitist strain of this account of democratic legitimation that is not only
consistent with practices of interbranch dialogue but may very well require it.206

202. See Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35
STAN. L. REV. 213, 241–49, 256–57 (1983).
203. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 52.
204. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 5, at 47.
205. See Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903, 903–04
(2006).
206. On the elitist and non-elitist versions of deliberative democracy, see ETHAN J. LEIB,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT 31–35 (2004); Leib, supra note 205, at 912; and David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib,
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Indeed, to the extent one branch of government is too often left with the last
word, it is hard to stimulate the requisite form of deliberation necessary to make
sure that force of the better argument prevails over sheer power, a core
desideratum of deliberative democratic legitimation.207 This is part of why a
“stay in your lane” conception of the separation of powers, like the “systemic
turn” in deliberative democratic theory,208 tends to ignore the benefits that can
accrue from deep deliberative engagement across institutions.
Whatever contemporary theoretical gloss helps to reaffirm the importance of
interbranch dialogue on matters of statutory interpretation, there is a clear lineage
here that traces back to the “Legal Process” consensus,209 which remains relevant
even as it has been coopted by many and potentially superseded by more state-ofthe-art discourse. At its core,210 legal process–oriented thinking (1) rejects a
formalistic view of law that would treat it as science and deduction, in favor of an
acknowledgement that many sources of law are purposive efforts at policymaking;
(2) embraces heightened attention to comparative institutional competence in
figuring out how to design policy and good governance;211 and (3) emphasizes a
synthesis of principle and democratic processes, with the aspiration that the “twin

207.

208.
209.

210.
211.

Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2011).
Although the routine contrast is between “populist” and “elitist” versions of deliberative
democracy, the elitist visions usually imagine that deliberation happens within one supreme
branch—usually the judiciary or the legislature—and rarely appreciate that interbranch
deliberation is one excellent way to promote deliberative democracy. See JOSEPH M.
BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 3 (1994); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 8 (1996); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231–40 (expanded ed. 1993).
See generally JOHN UHR, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AUSTRALIA (1998) (exploring
deliberative democracy’s capacity to improve the legislative branch in particular); JEREMY
WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999) (exploring how deliberation helps
legitimize specifically the legislative branch).
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation
and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS
(James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).]
For a critique of the systemic turn, see Ponet & Leib, supra note 62.
The locus classicus is HART & SACKS, supra note 200. The “new legal process” school,
nomenclature attributable to Robert Weisberg, see Weisberg, supra note 202, develops some
of the latent themes in the work of Hart and Sacks. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Review, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1989).
This is not the place to perform an exhaustive history or bibliography of the legal process
tradition.
This tripartite summary is distilled from Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209, at 2032–33.
This feature is probably the one most distinctively associated with the school. It is often
traced to Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at
October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90–91, 94–96 (1935).
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sources of legitimacy [a]re mutually reinforcing.”212 These three tenets coalesce to
underwrite a dialogic approach to statutory interpretation,213 one made more
salient through modern deliberative democratic theory.
Rather than rehashing some of the difficulties with different kinds of
formalisms from a broadly realist perspective that the legal process school carries
forward,214 it is worth drawing out a feature of the law-as-policy message in the
first tenet adumbrated above that even neoformalists might be able to appreciate.
Seeing law as purposive in its nature—laws try to do things and coordinate
various actors in society—might enable some formalists to acknowledge that
both making law and interpreting law cannot be wholly disaggregated from the
underlying policies that legislators and judges are trying to promote. What this
recognition enables is yet another way through the challenge to dialogic thinking
that ties it too neatly to intentions. If one is skeptical that collective bodies and
institutions can have the kinds of intentions that could make conversation or
dialogue meaningful (as many formalists would be), perhaps it remains possible
to imagine purposes or plans being communicated to-and-fro among
institutions. Although formalists will constrain what kinds of evidence should
be probative to divine the relevant purposes, they can at least identify judicial
opinions and legislative preambles as articulating formal purposes and model
ways to bring them into conversation with one another. Perhaps one need look
no further than Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in King v. Burwell to see a
relatively formalistic judge215 identifying a legislative purpose or scheme to
resolve the case.216 Purposes are not intentions and paying attention to them can
still be useful for formalists and pragmatists alike.
The second tenet about comparative institutional competence is usually
focused on figuring out which institution is the right one to decide when they do

212. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209, at 2033.
213. It is likely that Popkin’s “collaborative model of statutory interpretation” is traceable to the
dimensions of the legal process tradition we specify here. See William D. Popkin, The
Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988). But that is a
thesis for another day; although we clearly find “collaboration” to be a productive modality
of interbranch dialogue, there are more adversarial forms of reciprocal engagement that we
would identify as importantly “dialogic.” The link from legal process to dialogic thinking in
the statutory interpretation theories of Bickel & Wellington, supra note 7, and CALABRESI,
supra note 52, is already explored in Weisberg, supra note 202.
214. For a sophisticated defense of formalism, see John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1999).
215. It is fairly conventional to identify Roberts as a formalist on separation of powers issues and
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Roberts, Kennedy, and the Subtle
Differences That Matter in Obergefell, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2015); Steven L. Winter,
John Roberts’ Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 549 (2009).
216. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492–94 (2015).
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not agree on an outcome. But it just as importantly seeks to ascertain “how the
different institutions can [deliberate together] most productively.”217 Not
only, then, do institutions set in motion purposes and plans, but institutions can
also have distinctive characters, characteristics, and competencies that can work
synergistically with others. The insight of legal process theory is that these
different characters, characteristics, and competencies can be brought together
usefully, not always but often, to promote the “reasoned elaboration” of legal
norms and principles.218 Far from speaking in different tongues as the skeptics
of dialogue might maintain,219 law often just is the voices from different
institutions all coming together to develop and contour policy, linking it to
principles over which they can contest openly and dialogically.
A third tenet of the legal process tradition, also linked to “reasoned
elaboration,” emphasizes the need for the law’s reasonableness. This dimension
of legal process further underscores the importance for the possibility of
dialogue, because legal process advocates see the interrelations of the divided
powers of the legislature and judiciary brought into a unified purposive project
to be the best hope to sustain the law’s substantive reasonableness.220 The
“dynamic interaction of different institutions creates public policy,” and
understanding that interaction dialogically supplies opportunities for helping
the relevant institutions to work jointly rather than at cross-purposes. Even
when the interaction is adversarial, orienting communicative acts toward
dialogue during relative contestation is still likely to be productive, legitimating,
and, ultimately, stabilizing.221 It is easier to learn from someone who is
calibrating pronouncements to be properly heard; it is easier to hear when a
speaker thinks about how the message is likely to be processed. Our vision of

217. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209, at 2033.
218. See HART & SACKS, supra note 200, at 145–52 (“The Process of Reasoned Elaboration of
Purportedly Determinate Directions” and “The Reasoned Elaboration of Avowedly
Indeterminate Directions”); see also id. at 161–67 (“The Interrelationships of the Major
Lawmaking Institutions in a Unitary System”).
219. See newcanodin, supra note 12.
220. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 123 (1940).
221. One can also see this idea in an “agonistic” strain of the modern project of deliberative
democracy, which seeks to harness strong difference to stabilize and legitimate the state. See
generally BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS (1993)
(arguing the conflict serves a central role in promoting democratic freedom). Although
there was a time when the project of deliberative democracy seemed to aim for consensus
and harmony, and “agonism” was a critique of deliberative democracy. See, e.g., Chantal
Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 66 SOC. RES. 745 (1999), there is
now a compatible strain of deliberative democracy that incorporates many of the central
lessons of agonistic political theory. See, e.g., Andrew Knops, Response, Debate: Agonism as
Deliberation—On Mouffe’s Theory of Democracy, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 115 (2007).
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interbranch dialogue supported by the tenets of legal process theory pays
homage to the “reciprocal dependence” of legislatures and judiciaries in their
“complex [joint] effort,”222 and helps each institution be both receptive to
learning and also more likely to be heeded by its coordinate branch.223
Admittedly, formalists of the sort we conjured in Part I may be
underwhelmed and want to stick with their hard separation of powers rhetoric;
they may think it more likely to orient role responsibility properly.224 But from a
legal process perspective, appreciating that legislatures and judges work together
to effectuate policy—and using interbranch dialogue as one important proxy for
that form of coordination and deliberation—is a better way of guaranteeing that
each institution keeps in proper perspective its distinctive and limited
characters, characteristics, and competencies. It is easy to exalt or distort them
when the institutions remain self-involved. And formalists, from the standpoint
of deliberative democratic theory, might be too optimistic that every branch just
keeping its proverbial head down and “staying in its lane” is conducive to policy
learning and coordination. Formalists have more faith in the contest for and the
assertion of power; deliberative democratic theorists, even those that bring
contestation to the center (so-called “agonistic deliberative democrats”), value
deliberation that is actually calibrated to communicate and take account of
others’ opinions and values.225 Still, it is our view that textualists and formalists
would do better to internalize the benefits of a dialogic posture.

222. FULLER, supra note 16, at 91, 134, 192.
223. We doubt this argument is guilty of the various fallacies Adrian Vermeule diagnoses in theories
that draw on a “many-minds-are better” ethos. See Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments
in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009). Most importantly, we are not seeking to
vindicate interbranch dialogue for solely epistemic reasons (as the text above makes clear), nor
are we looking to maximize the input of various minds. Rather, our legal-process-inspired
deliberative account of interbranch dialogue celebrates the interaction of different institutions
with different competencies, because it frames and orients the thinking of each branch
productively and because it helps branches promote reasoned elaboration as part of their
constructive engagement. We suspect this account would make it through Vermeule’s “filters”
for finding useful rather than deficient “many minds” arguments. Thanks to Tom Merrill for
special insights here.
224. Some of these judicial formalists who want to minimize the pull of legislative will may be
Blackstonian in spirit, “wish[ing] to preserve the common law as an entirely self-sufficient,
closed system of authority.” Weisberg, supra note 202, at 232. For this type of formalist, the
lack of interest in dialogue would be motivated by a largely antidemocratic sentiment.
Without denying the democratic credibility of the common law, see Matthew Steilen, The
Democratic Common Law, 10 J. JURIS. 437, 471–84 (2011) (arguing that the common law is
consistent with the principles of deliberative democracy), we do not take it to be our burden
to convince those without some basically modern view about the democratic authority of
legislation.
225. See sources cited supra note 221 (exploring the “agonistic” strain of deliberative democracy).
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A final reason it is desirable to adopt a model of interbranch dialogue in
statutory interpretation stems not from legal or political theory but, ironically
perhaps, from political science. Although political science is a natural home for
the kind of strategic, neoinstitutional, public choice, positive political theory,
and rational choice perspectives on the separate branches of government that
lead to skepticism about the possibilities for interbranch dialogue,226 there is also
an important strain of thinking about public law and public policy that uses some
of these methodological approaches with a different bottom line about the ways
different branches of government should be conceptualized. Consider Jeb
Barnes:
Contemporary American policymaking does not feature branches
of government that adhere to well-defined judicial, legislative, and
executive functions; it features a bramble of overlapping
policymaking forums . . . Instead of rejecting this state of affairs as
violating the standard view of the separation of powers, we should
consider rejecting the idea that branches of government should
adhere to preassigned, narrow roles when making policy, and
examine the more pressing issue of whether—and under what
conditions—the complex American system of separate institutions
sharing power promotes core democratic values, such as
encouraging diverse voices to participate in the shaping and
reshaping of national policy.227

While somewhat resonant of legal process theory228 and a kind of
“institutional” deliberative democratic theory, this window into interbranch
interaction is derived from a positive story about the formal understanding
of interbranch interaction by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution;229 an
empirical understanding about functional settlements and delegations among

226. See supra Part I. For some of these accounts and their influence on thinking about statutory
interpretation, see Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme
Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990); Edward P. Schwartz, Pablo T. Spiller & Santiago Urbiztondo, A
Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1994).
227. Jeb Barnes, Adversarial Legalism, the Rise of Judicial Policymaking, and the Separation-ofPowers Doctrine, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW, supra note 115, at 35, 48–49.
228. To be fair, legal process theory, because of its apparent commitment to different
competencies of different institutions, can be read to be more supportive of the separation
of powers than Barnes (as Barnes himself intimates). See id. at 40 (citing Lon Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978)). But Barnes is right to
highlight that institutional competence “is a relative and probabilistic concept that must be
assessed on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
229. Id. at 38–40.
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the branches;230 an evaluative assessment of what conduces to efficacy in
policymaking;231 a realistic and pragmatic understanding of how reciprocally
engaged policymaking may be more majoritarian and democratic than a rigid
view of the separation of powers;232 and, finally, a more realistic and less stylized
account about the substance of legislative-judicial interaction that is not purely
strategic.233 These arguments all owe their genesis to study in political science
rather than political theory.
Not only does this perspective from within political science reinforce the
normative import of the kind of dialogic thinking we have been exploring here
for judges and legislators,234 but it might end up being a useful frame for doing
more careful scholarship going forward. Too often, political scientists and legal
scholars have built their models and performed their institutional analyses by
developing theories of policymaking and doctrinal development that
concentrate on singular institutions.235 These studies pay attention at times to
the interface among the branches, but something is lost by not seeing a more fully
integrated picture of interbranch dialogue in developing law.236
The inability to incorporate a robust interbranch perspective may be due to
professional norms of subfield specialization237 or to implicit assumptions
among political scientists and legal scholars about competition among the
branches.238 Whatever the explanation, modeling many—though not all—of
the branches’ interactions as a form of dialogue may promise richer study of
policymaking and law in our complex regime. Without ignoring strategic,
ideological, and other institutional factors that clearly also motivate institutional
actors,239 bringing the interactions into the center of study, treating the dialogues
themselves as relevant units of analysis, will pay dividends to our understanding

230. Id. at 41.
231. Id. at 42.
232. Id. at 43–47; see also Neal Devins, Is Judicial Policymaking Countermajoritarian?, in MAKING
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an Interbranch Perspective, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW, supra note 115, at 3.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id. at 3–4. In previous work, we have sought to prove that within statutory interpretation,
practices of “legislative underwriting” show a collaborative spirit, counterbalancing focus
on adversarial “legislative overriding.” See Leib & Brudney, supra note 73.
239. Barnes & Miller, supra note 236, at 11 (acknowledging a multiplicity of motivations that can
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about how lawmaking and interpretation really happen. To be sure, not every
action and reaction is interbranch communication, as we have made clear. But
knowing when a real policy conversation is underway, and what the conditions
for those conversations are, will improve our understanding of political and legal
institutions and may improve our governance, accordingly.240
CONCLUSION
The idea of “interbranch dialogue” can be used as a slogan. We have tried
to identify the strongest arguments against taking “interbranch dialogue” too
seriously, and we recognize they raise challenges to mainstream statutory
interpretation, which may often take such dialogue for granted. To rehabilitate
the model of interbranch dialogue, we have sought to be more precise and even
circumspect about what can reasonably be taken to count as meaningful
reciprocal mutual engagement. Having set forth and examined a diverse range
of such responsive engagements, we have then extrapolated from our examples
to argue for the metaphor’s considerable explanatory value.
While we have proposed and sought to apply a rough definition of dialogue,
we recognize the limitations in settling on a fixed definitional approach. Our
deeper aim is to demonstrate the enduring plausibility of interbranch dialogue
as well as its continuing importance—descriptively and normatively—in the
doctrines, practices, and theory of statutory interpretation. In the final analysis,
although we might caution judges, legislators, and scholars to be more careful
about their usage going forward, we believe that retaining the model of
interbranch dialogue in statutory interpretation is both warranted and desirable.
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